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THE CASE AGAINST EQUITY IN 
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 
JODY P. KRAUS* & ROBERT E. SCOTT† 
The American common law of contracts appears to direct courts to 
decide contract disputes by considering two opposing points of view: the ex 
ante perspective of the parties’ intent at the time of formation, and the ex 
post perspective of justice and fairness to the parties at the time of 
adjudication. Despite the black letter authority for both perspectives, the ex 
post perspective cannot withstand scrutiny. Contract doctrines taking the ex 
post perspective—such as the penalty, just compensation, and forfeiture 
doctrines—were created by equity in the early common law to police against 
abuses of the then prevalent penal bond. However, when the industrial 
revolution pushed courts to accommodate fully executory agreements, and 
parties abandoned the use of penal bonds, the exclusively ex ante focus of 
the new contract law that emerged rendered the ex post doctrines obsolete. 
While initially intended to do justice between the parties, if used today these 
doctrines perversely and unjustly deny parties contractual rights that were 
bargained for in a free and fair agreement. Yet judges continue to recognize 
the ex post doctrines, even as they struggle to reconcile them with respect 
for the parties’ intent. Although infrequently applied, the ex post doctrines 
are far from dead letter. The penumbra of uncertainty they cast over contract 
adjudication continues to undermine contracting parties’ personal 
sovereignty. The only case for continuing to recognize these equitable 
interventions, therefore, must turn on whether they serve a new valid 
purpose. We consider and reject the possible purposes of paternalism and 
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anti-opportunism suggested by contemporary pluralist scholars. In our view, 
the criteria governing theories of legal interpretation support the 
interpretation of contract law as exclusively serving personal sovereignty 
rather than any pluralist interpretation. Under its best interpretation, 
contract law has no place for the ex post perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Judge Richard Posner decided Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum 
Co.,1 he went out of his way to explain that the governing Illinois common 
law doctrine, the “penalty doctrine,” which makes supra-compensatory 
liquidated damages clauses unenforceable, was clearly unjustified. Yet 
Posner applied the doctrine anyway. As a federal judge sitting in a diversity 
case, Posner explained, 
we must be on guard to avoid importing our own ideas of sound public 
policy into an area where our proper judicial role is more than usually 
deferential. The responsibility for making innovations in the common law 
of Illinois rests with the courts of Illinois, and not with the federal courts 
in Illinois. And like every other state, Illinois, untroubled by academic 
skepticism of the wisdom of refusing to enforce penalty clauses against 
sophisticated promisors . . . continues steadfastly to insist on the 
distinction between penalties and liquidated damages.2 
Having determined that the contract’s liquidated damages clause 
operated as a penalty, Posner refused to enforce it even though it was the 
product of a voluntary agreement following extensive bilateral negotiations 
between sophisticated parties.3 By refusing to enforce the liquidated 
 
 1. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 2. Id. at 1289. 
 3. Posner’s decision has also been criticized on the ground that the clause did not, in fact, operate 
as a penalty. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN 83 
(2015). 
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damages clause, Lake River refused to respect the parties’ personal 
sovereignty. 
There are numerous instances in which parties might rationally choose 
to agree to liquidated damages clauses that provide a supra-compensatory 
recovery. Perhaps most significantly, contract law does not, by its default 
rules, recognize sentimental, aesthetic, or idiosyncratic value in assessing 
damages.4 As a default proposition, this premise makes good sense. But 
courts violate personal sovereignty if they treat it as a mandatory rule that 
prevents parties who have such values from opting out. Yet, the just 
compensation principle, which provides a mandatory rule of compensatory 
damages for breach of contract, often leads courts to do just that. A striking 
example is the well-known case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining 
Co.5 The plaintiffs, a Native American family, signed a strip-mining lease 
only after foregoing a $3,000 payment in exchange for the agreement by the 
Coal Company to restore their land after the end of the lease. The Coal 
Company breached the agreement, leaving an unusable and unsightly tract 
filled with pits and spoil banks. On appeal, the court limited the plaintiffs’ 
recovery to the $300 difference between the value of the land with and 
without the regrading, despite expert testimony estimating the cost of 
regrading at $29,000.6 Much of the Court’s opinion rests on the strict 
limitations of the compensation principle and the claim that a damage award 
measured by the regrading cost would confer an inequitable windfall on the 
Peevyhouses in violation of that principle.7 By the same logic, the Court 
would also have refused to enforce a well-drafted liquidated damages clause 
designed to protect the Peevyhouses’ interest in ensuring that their land 
 
 4. See, e.g., Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Kahn, 300 F.2d 910, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“Even if [the] 
action [is] brought in quantum meruit . . . the measure of recovery [is] the market value . . . .”). 
Sentimental or idiosyncratic value has traditionally been described as pretium affectionis. In Thomason 
v. Hackney & Moale Co., 74 S.E. 1022, 1024 (N.C. 1912), the court defined it as a “value placed upon a 
thing by the fancy of its owner, growing out of his or her attachment for the specific article, its 
associations, and so forth . . . .” For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated 
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). 
 5. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Peevyhouse in 1994 in a case with substantially identical facts, 
Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994). 
 6. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111, 114. The Peevyhouse family remains on the land, ungraded, to 
this day. For a discussion of the effort by the Peevyhouses to bargain for regrading in their contract with 
the mining company and the ongoing costs of the coal company’s deliberate breach of their agreement, 
see generally Judith Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie 
and Lucille, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995). 
 7. The just compensation principle in Oklahoma provides that “no person can recover a greater 
amount in damages for the breach of an obligation, than he would have gained by the performance 
thereof.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 96 (2020). Given that principle, the court held that allowing the 
Peevyhouses to recover for the cost of regrading their land would impose “unconscionable and [] 
oppressive damages, contrary to substantial justice.” Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 113. 
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would be restored to its original condition.8 
 The refusal to permit parties to protect their personal, aesthetic, or 
idiosyncratic value either through express performance terms or liquidated 
damages clauses is only one example of the ways in which the penalty 
doctrine and its twin, the just compensation principle, undermine the parties’ 
sovereignty over the terms of their ex ante contract. In this Article, we 
demonstrate that in the early common law courts of equity created these 
doctrines, and the related doctrines of forfeiture and excuse, to prevent the 
abusive enforcement of penal bonds. However, these doctrines no longer 
served their original purpose once the contemporary practice of relying on 
fully executory agreements (which courts began to enforce for the first time 
following the industrial revolution) replaced the practice of exchanging 
penal bonds to enforce commercial arrangements. 
What then explains the persistence of doctrines that history shows 
courts developed to prevent the abuse of archaic methods of contract 
enforcement that parties abandoned over two centuries ago? And what 
explains the injustices visited on the commercial seller in Lake River and the 
homeowners in Peevyhouse? The answer lies in the received view that the 
American common law of contracts properly directs courts to decide contract 
disputes by considering two opposing points of view: the ex ante perspective 
of the parties’ intent at the time of formation, and the ex post perspective of 
justice and fairness to the parties at the time of adjudication.9 According to 
the received view, then, American contract law has two faces. The first faces 
forward. In the ordinary course, courts decide cases based on the ex ante 
perspective.10 Doctrines based on the ex ante perspective support the view 
that contract law provides “a domain or territory in which the self is 
sovereign” and therefore vindicates the value of personal sovereignty.11 
 
 8. For discussion, see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient 
Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1610 (2008). 
 9. We confine our thesis to the American common law of contracts. For ease of exposition, unless 
otherwise indicated, all references to “American contract law,” “contract law,” “the common law of 
contracts,” etc. refer only to the American common law of contracts.  
 10. Intention in contract law is determined objectively and prospectively. A party is taken to intend 
what its contracting partner could reasonably believe it intended when the parties contracted. Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568–
70 (2003).  
 11. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 52 (1986). 
Feinberg explains the personal sovereignty conception of individual autonomy on analogy to state 
sovereignty: “The politically independent state is said to be sovereign over its own territory. Personal 
autonomy similarly involves the idea of having a domain or territory in which the self is sovereign.” Id. 
Feinberg defines the personal sovereignty view as holding that “respect for a person’s autonomy is respect 
for his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the interests 
of others need protection from him.” Id. at 68. Although Feinberg offers the personal sovereignty 
conception of autonomy as a normative basis for limiting the exercise of political coercion, we believe it 
also constitutes a fundamental value in any plausible overall theory of morality. In Rawlsian terms, 
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According to the personal sovereignty view of contracts, it is always just and 
fair to the parties to hold them to agreements reached under free and fair 
conditions.12 The personal sovereignty view therefore holds that contract law 
exists to give effect to ex ante agreements reached under free and fair 
conditions, subject to the requirements of the principles of social justice that 
govern society as a whole.13 Thus, while justice in society as a whole, or 
“social justice,” requires the vindication of multiple and potentially 
competing values, justice between the parties, or “individual justice,” 
requires only the vindication of the value of personal sovereignty by 
enforcing an agreement that is just and fair to the parties.14 
The second face of American contract law faces backwards. Doctrines 
facing backwards take the ex post perspective by overriding agreements as 
the parties’ understood them at the time they reached them. These ex post 
doctrines rest on the premise that enforcing agreements according to the 
parties’ intent at formation can be individually unjust, even if the parties 
agreed to them under free and fair conditions.15 Consider again the penalty 
rule invoked in Lake River, which provides that a “term fixing unreasonably 
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a 
 
personal sovereignty recognizes the fundamental right of individuals to choose, revise, and pursue their 
own system of ends. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (1993) (arguing that individuals have 
the capacity for a conception of the good, which is a capacity “to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue 
a conception of one’s rational advantage or good”); see also Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of 
Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1608 (2009). 
 12. The doctrines of capacity, fraud, duress, and procedural unconscionability together restrict 
enforcement to only these agreements. For a discussion of these doctrines, see infra Part II. 
 13. The principles of social justice provide various grounds for limiting personal sovereignty, 
including the prevention of harm to others. We use the term “social justice” to refer to the domain of 
issues addressed by traditional normative political theories, such as Rawls’ theory of justice, which limit 
individual liberty not only to prevent harm to others but also to ensure robust equality through measures 
to effect redistribution and equality of opportunity. In contrast, “individual justice” in contract refers to 
the normative status of individual relationships arising out of voluntarily incurred moral obligations. 
Thus, justice in society as a whole, or “social justice,” requires the vindication of multiple, and potentially 
competing values. We argue, however, that justice between the parties, or “individual justice,” requires 
the vindication of only the value of personal sovereignty. 
 14. The personal sovereignty view is not imperialistic. It is therefore consistent with the existence 
of doctrines, such as illegality and public policy, that permit courts to refuse to enforce agreements 
reached under free and fair conditions when necessary to satisfy the demands of social justice. Contract 
law recognizes explicitly that the value of personal sovereignty does not license conduct that harms 
others, and therefore limits enforcement to agreements that do not materially harm others. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For discussion, see infra Part II.  
 15. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 207, 208–09 (2009) (arguing that unexpected circumstances cases “should take ex post 
considerations into account” and rejecting the view that such cases “should focus exclusively on the 
parties’ expectations ex ante, at the moment of contract formation, and should not take into account ex 
post considerations—that is, gains and losses to both parties that either arose under the contract prior to 
the occurrence of the unexpected circumstances, or resulted proximately from or were made possible by 
the occurrence”). 
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penalty.”16 As the Second Restatement of Contracts explains, the penalty 
rule is justified by the just compensation principle: “[T]he parties to a 
contract are not free to provide a penalty for its breach. The central objective 
behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive. 
Punishment of a promisor for having broken his promise has no justification 
on either economic or other grounds . . . .”17 According to the just 
compensation principle, therefore, supra-compensatory damages offend 
principles of individual justice: Damages in excess of the actual loss from 
breach are necessarily unjust to the breaching party, even if that party agreed 
in a free and fair bargain to pay such damages in the event of breach. On this 
view, individual justice turns in part on facts that arise only after agreements 
are formed and events unfold, and so can be discerned only by courts ex post, 
at the time of adjudication.18 This is the moral logic of the ex post 
perspective. 
The same logic underlies other ex post doctrines that license courts, for 
example, to abrogate contract terms when their enforcement would lead to 
“oppressive results,” such as a “forfeiture” that imposes severe losses on one 
 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356. 
 17. Id. § 356 cmt. a; see, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla. 
1962) (“[W]here an obligation . . . appears to create a right to unconscionable . . . damages, contrary to 
substantial justice no more than reasonable damages can be recovered.”) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, 
§ 97 (2020)); see also Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858). As noted in text, the just compensation 
principle has also been invoked to justify ex post review of expectation damage recoveries. For 
discussion, see infra Sections I.B.2, III.A.2. 
 18. Of course, doctrines designed to ensure ex post justice, so conceived, include doctrines that 
license courts not only to police against contracts that turn out to be unjust in light of facts that occurred 
after formation, but to police against contracts that create the risk of ex post injustice at the time of 
formation irrespective of whether that risk materialized after formation. For example, U.C.C. § 2-302 
holds that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.” U.C.C. § 2-302 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (emphasis added). Likewise, U.C.C. § 2-718(1) states that 
“[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is 
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach.” U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court in Lake River Corp. v. 
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), holds that “[t]o be valid under 
Illinois law a liquidation of damages must be a reasonable estimate at the time of contracting of the likely 
damages from breach, and the need for estimation at that time must be shown by reference to the likely 
difficulty of measuring the actual damages from a breach of contract . . . .” Even though these doctrines 
invite courts to invalidate liquidated damage clauses without determining whether or not those clauses 
turned out to be over-compensatory at the time of adjudication, they are justified on the ground that 
policing against clauses that create the risk of over-compensation at the time of formation will thereby 
decrease the frequency of contracts that include clauses that create a risk that courts will (mistakenly) 
enforce a penalty at the time of adjudication. In short, whether they invite courts to invalidate liquidated 
damages clauses based on realized ex post injustice or the ex ante risk of ex post injustice, all of these 
doctrines are ultimately justified on the ground that courts should seek to prevent ex post injustice. We 
are grateful to Ethan Leib for calling our attention to the apparent tension between our definition of ex 
post injustice and doctrines that serve to prevent ex post injustice by policing against clauses that create 
the risk of ex post injustice at the time of formation.  
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party and confers a “windfall” on the other.19 These doctrines direct courts 
to interpret contracts, when possible, to avoid the risk of forfeiture,20 and 
empower courts to excuse conditions when their imposition will impose an 
actual forfeiture.21 The power to excuse conditions applies to “a term that 
does not appear to be unconscionable at the time the contract is made but 
that would, because of ensuing events, cause forfeiture.”22 As Justice 
Cardozo explained in the landmark case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,23 
the enforcement of contracts—even those agreed to under free and fair 
conditions—will sometimes “visit venial faults with oppressive 
retribution”24 that is “grievously out of proportion to”25 the loss caused by 
default. Enforcement in such cases would result in “cruelty”26 and a 
“sacrifice of justice.”27 Even though ex ante contract doctrine takes the 
enforcement of agreements reached under free and fair conditions to be 
individually just to the parties, “courts have balanced such considerations 
against those of equity and fairness, and found the latter to be the 
weightier.”28 
The moral intuitions fueling Justice Cardozo’s opinion are easy to grasp 
and difficult to resist. If a builder has built the house he promised to build 
for a landowner, but his performance falls short of perfection, it seems only 
just and fair that he compensates the owner for the loss caused by his breach. 
But to deprive him entirely of his right to a final payment unless he cures the 
default at enormous expense seems inequitable, unjust, and unfair. As long 
as he makes the owner whole, the owner should still pay him for his 
performance. To do otherwise would impose a forfeiture on the builder and 
provide a windfall to the owner. Surely justice cannot turn a blind eye to the 
 
 19. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains, the “non-occurrence of a condition of an 
obligor’s duty may cause the obligee to lose his right to the agreed exchange after he has relied 
substantially on the expectation of that exchange, as by preparation or performance. The word ‘forfeiture’ 
is used . . . to refer to the denial of compensation that results in such a case.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b. 
 20. Id. § 227. 
 21. Id. § 229. 
 22. Id. § 229 cmt. a. 
 23. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
 24. Id. at 891. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. Justice Cardozo also appears to believe, however, that contract law should nonetheless 
always enforce even “cruel” terms that result in a “sacrifice of justice” if the parties have included them 
explicitly. “This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose 
that performance of every term shall be a condition of recovery.” Id. The Restatement, however, 
disagrees: “[u]nder the present Section a court may, in appropriate circumstances, excuse the non-
occurrence of a condition solely on the basis of the forfeiture that would otherwise result.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. a. 
 28. Jacobs & Youngs, 129 N.E . at 891. 
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inequity of forfeitures and windfalls, even if they happen to result from the 
enforcement of an otherwise free and fair agreement. Courts must therefore 
subject even agreements reached under free and fair conditions to equitable 
review at the time of adjudication in order to protect the parties from the 
possible individual injustice of holding them to their own commitments. 
Despite their surface appeal, however, these intuitions rest on 
crumbling foundations. As a moral matter, if a competent party—such as the 
Garland Coal Company in Peevyhouse—agreed to bear the risk of a loss 
from regrading property at a cost that exceeds the market value of the land, 
and was compensated for doing so, that fact alone conclusively establishes 
the justice and fairness of imposing the loss on that party.29 To hold 
otherwise not only unfairly shifts a loss from the party who was paid to bear 
it to the party who paid to avoid it, but also violates the personal sovereignty 
of the parties to the agreement and all future contracting parties who lose the 
option to make and enforce such an agreement. The intuition that profoundly 
unequal post-contractual gains and losses can be individually unjust or 
unfair, in and of themselves, is therefore an illusion. 
As a legal matter, the view that ex post doctrines are a legitimate part 
of American contract law is also mistaken. Like the light of a distant star that 
died long ago, the ex post doctrines that require “just compensation,”30 forbid 
penalties,31 avoid forfeitures,32 and excuse hardship33 emanate from a source 
that no longer exists. Originating in the English Courts of Equity during the 
early common law, the ex post perspective pervaded early contract law as a 
necessary corrective to the abusive enforcement of penal bonds.34 But when 
the industrial revolution led American courts to enforce executory 
agreements for the first time, and reject penal bonds as potentially abusive, 
the ex ante perspective alone formed the foundational doctrines that 
emerged.35 The tightly woven fabric of ex ante doctrines comprising the 
modern American law of contracts left no room for these ancient (and 
archaic) equitable principles. Although these doctrines continue to enjoy 
support from the Restatement and prominent commentators, they cannot be 
 
 29. For an argument that the opinion in Jacob &Youngs, Inc. v. Kent unfairly denied the owners 
their right to restitution of the price they paid to have the builder bear the risk of repairing or replacing 
defective conditions, see generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (“The parties to a contract may 
effectively provide in advance the damages that are to be payable in the event of breach as long as the 
provision does not disregard the principle of compensation.”). 
 31. Id. § 356.  
 32. Id. § 227. 
 33. Id. § 261. 
 34. Performance (or “penal”) bonds were the dominant legal mechanism for arranging exchange 
transactions from Tudor times until the nineteenth century. For discussion, see infra Section I.A.1. 
 35. See discussion infra Section I.A.2. 
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reconciled with American contract law’s otherwise univocal and 
foundational commitment to vindicating personal sovereignty. By giving 
these ex post doctrines equal billing on the marquee of American contract 
law, black letter authorities create the impression that the ex ante and the ex 
post are two equally important, and compatible, faces of American contract 
law. They are not.36 
The vestigial ex post doctrines are in fundamental tension with the 
commitment to honor ex ante intent: they undermine contract law’s 
commitment to vindicating personal sovereignty by requiring parties either 
to use less effective means to avoid terms the doctrines forbid, or to abandon 
their most preferred contracting strategies altogether in favor of less effective 
ones. The more serious concern, however, is that the prominence of these ex 
post contract doctrines has led to a body of scholarship that has elevated the 
influence of the ex post perspective in contract adjudication well beyond the 
narrow scope of the doctrines themselves. Their official status has misled 
influential legal scholars into conceiving of contract law as a pluralistic 
enterprise that serves justice by combining the ex ante and ex post 
perspectives in every case, not merely the handful of cases to which the ex 
post doctrines apply. Some scholars have called for the wholesale expansion 
of the unconscionability doctrine as the primary vehicle for extending the 
reach of the ex post perspective into every contract case.37 Others have 
argued that the goal of preventing opportunism can explain and justify the 
exercise of ex post equity.38 The pluralist account of contract law therefore 
 
 36. To be sure, courts quite properly continue to recognize the applicability of doctrines that equate 
the justice of outcomes under an agreement with the justice of the bargaining process that produced it. 
Rather than overriding ex ante intent, equitable doctrines such as capacity, duress, fraud, and procedural 
unconscionability actually reinforce the ex ante perspective that limits enforcement to agreements reached 
under free and fair conditions. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 37. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
741, 752–54 (1982) (“Over the last fifteen years, however, there have been strong indications that the 
principle of unconscionability authorizes a review of elements well beyond unfair surprise, including, in 
appropriate cases, fairness of terms . . . . [A] number of cases have held or indicated that the principle of 
unconscionability permits enforcement of a promise to be limited on the basis of unfair price 
alone . . . . As these phenomena have accumulated, it has become clear that they . . . can be explained 
only on the basis of an expanded, paradigmatic concept of unconscionability that is not limited to 
procedural elements such as unfair surprise . . . . This new paradigm does not replace the bargain 
principle . . . . Rather, the new paradigm creates a theoretical framework that explains most of the limits 
that have been or should be placed upon that principle, based on the quality of the bargain. What lies 
ahead is to articulate and extend the unconscionability paradigm through the development of specific 
norms, other than unfair surprise, that can guide the resolution of specific cases.”) 
 38. Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman & Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of Equity as Anti-
Opportunism (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper, Paper No. 13-15, 2013), https://papers.ss 
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245098 [https://perma.cc/B38L-5ZLR]. The defenders of equity 
argue that no set of legal rules can anticipate and thereby prevent the infinitely many and unpredictable 
ways in which individuals might seek to subvert the parties’ intentions after they reach agreement. They 
conclude that contract law therefore must subject every agreement to ex post judicial review in order to 
police against opportunistic behavior that the parties could not have anticipated and thus prevented. Id. at 
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treats the ex post doctrines as just one among many other contract doctrines 
properly dedicated to vindicating multiple values that contract law must take 
into account, in addition to personal sovereignty, in order to prevent the 
enforcement of unjust agreements.39 
In this Article, we offer a contrasting account of American contract law, 
one that explains and understands contract as vindicating personal 
sovereignty by honoring the ex ante intentions of contracting parties. On our 
account, the ex post contract doctrines, as applied today, are legal error—
vestigial survivors of an originally noble effort to counteract the injustice of 
an extinct contract doctrine that is long extinct. They now perversely vitiate, 
rather than vindicate, justice for parties who rely on the rights and obligations 
they intended their agreements to create. Moreover, these doctrines cause 
harm by serving as the anchor for an academic-judicial feedback loop that 
legitimizes the ex post perspective generally in contract law.40 The resulting 
roving portfolio of ex post reasoning in contract cases not only increases the 
risk that the outcomes of contract adjudication will be (ex ante) unfair, but 
also increases the opportunity for parties to credibly threaten strategic 
litigation to exact ex post redistribution of contractual gains and losses.41 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explain how the ex post 
contract doctrines became unmoored from their original rationale in the early 
common law and were carried over to modern American contract law 
through a combination of misunderstanding and allegiance to precedent.42 
Because the early common law came to depend exclusively on the penal 
bond for commercial exchange, the ex post doctrines emerged in equity to 
control resulting abuses. We then show how the American common law of 
contract was transformed by the industrial revolution into an institution 
devoted exclusively to enforcing executory agreements according to the 
 
25; see also George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 941, 957 (1992) (defining opportunism as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the 
other party’s reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or conventional 
morality”).  
 39. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW 
ESSAYS 206, 240–41 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (“Part of the human moral condition is that we hold many 
proper values, some of which will conflict in given cases, and part of the human social condition is that 
many values are relevant to the creation of a good world, some of which will conflict in given cases. 
Contract law cannot escape these moral and social conditions. In contract law, as in life, all meritorious 
values must be taken into account, even if those values may sometimes conflict, and even at the expense 
of determinacy. Single-value, metric theories of the best content of law must inevitably fail precisely 
because they deny the complexity of life. Accordingly, the theory of contracts—the principle that tells us 
how to make the best possible rules of contract law—must accommodate multiple values . . . .”) 
 40. See infra notes 142–51 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule 
Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1574–75 (2016). 
 42. Id. at 1533–45. 
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parties’ ex ante intentions, thereby eliminating the need for penal bonds and 
the ex post doctrines designed to prevent their unjust enforcement. 
In Part II, we provide the philosophical basis for our claim that 
American contract law is devoted exclusively to promoting the value of 
personal sovereignty. We lay out Ronald Dworkin’s basic criteria for legal 
explanation and argue that the personal sovereignty interpretation of contract 
law fares better on those criteria than pluralism because it holds that the ex 
ante doctrines, which comprise the vast majority of contract law, serve a 
more compelling moral purpose. Contrary to what we call the “ex post 
fallacy,” the justice and fairness of “disproportionate” or “over-
compensatory” outcomes turn entirely on the ex ante justice and fairness of 
the bargain that produces them. Finally, we demonstrate that the values of 
paternalism and anti-opportunism are logically incompatible with respect for 
personal sovereignty. 
In Part III, we identify the range of harms caused by the mistaken 
inclusion of ex post doctrines in American contract law. We show how the 
ex post doctrines impose obstacles to preferred modes of contracting that 
require parties to use less effective means for accomplishing their purposes. 
We illustrate how the presence of these doctrines has cultivated a judicial 
receptivity to the ex post perspective more generally, sometimes leading 
courts tempted by the ex post fallacy to override the parties’ ex ante intent. 
We conclude that the ex post perspective is incompatible with the personal 
sovereignty account of contract law. Although American law certainly 
vindicates plural and conflicting values, American contract law does not. 
Personal sovereignty is limited by the requirements of social justice, but it 
conflicts with no values within contract law itself. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONTRACT 
LAW 
A.  THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 
1.  The Limits of Contract Law at Early Common Law 
At early common law, there was no cause of action for breach of an 
informal (unsealed) executory promise. The only actions available for breach 
of contract were the action in covenant (for promises under seal) and the 
action for debt. The action for debt, moreover, was available only for the 
recovery of a sum certain owed by the promisor to the promisee.43 The 
 
 43. JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 92 
(1913); JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 322 (2d ed. 2009); A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
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promisee bringing an action in debt sought simply to recover the amount 
fixed by the parties’ agreement. The court would decide whether to award 
payment based solely on the validity of the instrument, the due date, and 
evidence of payment. No occasion arose for judges to fill contractual gaps or 
award compensation for breach.44 
The evolution of commercial exchange during the late middle ages 
eventually led the English common law courts to recognize a promisee’s 
right to recover for breach of an informal promise by bringing an action in 
assumpsit.45 But that action was available only for plaintiffs who had either 
conferred benefits or taken action in preparation for performance in reliance 
on the defendant’s promise.46 In either case, a plaintiff seeking relief via 
assumpsit for breach of an informal promise sought compensation under a 
theory of reimbursement for the loss of whatever the plaintiff had already 
given to the promisor (directly or indirectly).47 No remedy was available for 
loss of the promisee’s expectancy.48 Importantly, as we explain below, the 
final stage of the development of modern contract law—the enforcement of 
purely executory promises—did not occur in America until the beginning of 
the nineteenth century.49 
 
LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 47–48 (1987). 
 44. AMES, supra note 43, at 88–89. Where a seller tendered goods to a buyer and the buyer refused 
to accept delivery, the seller could sue in debt for the purchase price and force the buyer to take delivery 
of the goods (for which title had passed under the contract). But alternatively, if the buyer tendered the 
purchase price and the seller refused to transfer goods that were then available, the buyer’s only recourse 
was to bring an action in equity for specific performance because the remedy at law was inadequate. As 
a consequence of these limited options, contract default rules that assigned unanticipated risks and 
specified the consequences of nonperformance were simply inapt and thus unknown. Morton J. Horwitz, 
The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974). Horwitz cites only 
two English cases in the eighteenth century that even raise the issue of a default measure of damages. In 
Flureau v. Thornhill [1828] 96 Eng. Rep. 635, the court limited the plaintiff to restitution damages, 
holding that plaintiff could not be entitled to damages “for the fancied goodness of the bargain, which he 
supposes he has lost.” In the United States, only a few actions for breach of executory contracts were 
brought before the Revolution. See, e.g., Boehm & Shitz v. Engle, 1 Dall. 15, 15 (Pa. 1767), where the 
seller was allowed to sue for the price of a breached contract for the sale of land. 
 45. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 637–46 (5th ed. 
1956).  
 46. Assumpsit had developed initially to provide a cause of action for the negligence of a bailee or 
carrier for hire. Over time, the action in assumpsit was extended to nonperformance of certain promissory 
undertakings. AMES, supra note 43, at 130–31. 
 47. During this early period of the action in assumpsit, a plaintiff could bring an action for breach 
of promise independent of the doctrine of consideration and the concept of exchange. Id. at 130. The early 
notion of special assumpsit (the contract action) did not require a quid pro quo as was required for an 
action for debt, which was explicitly tied to the notion of exchange. Id. at 147. 
 48. In the absence of legal enforcement, commercial parties relied on the law merchant and 
medieval trade fairs as a means of self-enforcing informal promises. Avner Greif, Informal Contract 
Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 287, 288–89 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 49. See infra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
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i.  The Preeminence of Penal Bonds in Commercial Exchange 
Given that executory contracts were not legally enforceable, and actions 
in debt and assumpsit provided limited legal means for parties to make 
enforceable future commitments, commercial parties conducted exchange 
transactions by adapting other legal mechanisms to suit their needs.50 
Although contracting parties participating in annual merchant fairs often 
relied on self-enforcement of their bargains,51 they also adapted the penal 
bond to make legally enforceable commitments. A penal bond was a sealed 
promise52 to pay a sum of money subject to a “condition of defeasance,” 
which appeared on the back of the bond itself. Upon satisfaction of the 
condition, the bond became void and the promisor had the right to demand 
return of the bond from the promisee. The advantage of using a formal 
instrument was that the promise to pay was conclusively enforceable at face 
value by an action of debt on an obligation at common law, subject 
essentially only to the defenses of forgery or proof of satisfaction of the 
condition of defeasance.53 In effect, the bond served as a means of 
specifically enforcing a contract, with the stated monetary obligation serving 
as security to ensure performance. 
It is hard to overestimate the importance of the penal bond to 
commercial exchange during the early common law. Suits on performance 
bonds were the single most common class of actions in the English courts of 
law by Tudor times and they remained so for the next three centuries.54 
According to Horwitz, at the beginning of the nineteenth century virtually 
all large business transactions took the form of two independent bonds, each 
of which stipulated damages for failure to perform an executory promise.55 
To support an exchange transaction, each party would sign a bond (often for 
double the value of a promised performance) that was made subject to the 
defeasing condition of the successful performance of the specific service or 
 
 50. It is possible that the early common law might have been able to enforce executory promises 
through the action in covenant. But covenants had to be under seal to be enforceable and this would have 
limited this device to situations where the parties were prepared to go to the expense and difficulty of 
sealing a deed. We are grateful to David Waddilove for alerting us to this option. 
 51. Greif, supra note 48. 
 52. A sealed promise is a promise evidenced by a writing and stamped with a wax seal. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
 53. See A. W. B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82 LAW Q. REV. 392, 
411–12 (1966) (explaining that “[t]he law governing bonds is tough law” and that such conditional bonds 
were almost always enforced); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, 3 A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES; OR AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF PECUNIARY 
COMPENSATION AWARDED BY COURTS OF JUSTICE 392, 393 (Arthur G. Sedgwick & Joseph H. Beale, Jr. 
eds., 2d ed. 1852) (noting a penalty “was recoverable without any reference whatever to the actual 
damages incurred”). 
 54. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 324 (4th ed. 2002). 
 55. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 928. 
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the delivery of goods or money at a time certain.56 If the condition was not 
satisfied, the bond was enforceable and the penalty became due.57 
Penal bonds thus served as the substitute for legally binding executory 
contracts throughout the early common law. However, as we note below, 
these bonds were not only subject to abuse, but their use hindered the 
development of a law of contract: all of the contractual issues underlying the 
obligations they were used to enforce, including how courts should fill gaps 
in the absence of express agreement, were “hidden on the back of the 
bond.”58 Indeed, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the number of 
bonds used to effect commercial transactions in America greatly exceeded 
the number of contracts that sought to enforce mutual promises.59 The 
dominance of bonds, bills of exchange, and other sealed instruments 
deprived commercial parties of the incentive to take their transactional 
disputes to common law courts. As a result, the default rules of contemporary 
contract law that support parties’ ex ante intentions did not develop until the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
ii.  The Origins of Ex Post Equitable Doctrines Overriding Party Intent 
All of the equitable doctrines that carried over into modern contract law 
owe their origins to efforts by courts of chancery to constrain the abuses 
caused by the arcane doctrines used by the courts of law to enforce the 
ubiquitous penal bonds.60 Recall that if the condition on the back of the bond 
was not satisfied, the bond was enforceable and the penalty became due. 
Alternatively, if the condition was satisfied (for example the promisor 
performed the designated service or delivered the promised goods), then the 
promisor was entitled to demand return of the bond. However, if the 
promisor failed to receive the bond in return for satisfaction of the condition 
 
 56. SEDGWICK, supra note 53, at 393. 
 57. Imagine, for example, that on January 1 a farmer promised to deliver a dozen barrels of apples 
to a grocer on March 1 in return for the grocer’s promise to pay the farmer £500. To make their promises 
legally enforceable, the farmer would sign a bond entitling the grocer to payment of £1000 subject to the 
defeasing condition that the farmer deliver apples to the grocer at the stated time. If the farmer could not 
prove satisfaction of the condition, the grocer could enforce the bond and the farmer would have to pay 
the £1000 penalty. Likewise, the grocer might sign a bond entitling the farmer to a payment of £1000 
subject to the defeasing condition that the grocer pay £500 to the farmer upon the delivery of the apples 
on March 1 and the same enforcement conditions would apply.  
 58. BAKER, supra note 54, at 324. 
 59. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 929. 
 60. The English courts of law followed objective and rigid procedural and substantive rules for 
enforcing penal bonds, which minimized the need for subjective judgment in their application. In 
response, the Court of Chancery began to exercise overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts 
to hear cases that in “the ordinary course of law failed to provide justice.” BAKER, supra note 54, at 117; 
see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 320 (“Chancery developed the practice of relieving against 
a contractual obligation that was enforceable at common law, in circumstances in which permitting 
enforcement would have been unjust.”). 
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and the promisee subsequently sought to enforce the bond, the only defense 
available to the promisor in a court of law was an “acquittance,” a formal 
writing signed by the promisee stating that the debt evidenced by the bond 
had been paid.61 As a result, when legally naïve promisors failed to demand 
either return of the bond or an acquittance following performance, and the 
bondholder sought to enforce the bond, common law courts acknowledged 
that they were bound to enforce the bond even though doing so penalized a 
promisor who had already performed their promise.62 
Predictably, a debtor facing such a risk filed a petition in a court of 
equity seeking relief from the prospect of an unjust penalty at law. Relief 
against such penalties was thus one of the earliest examples of equitable 
interference with courts of law that developed in response to the common 
law’s lack of adequate machinery for trying cases of fraud.63 Similarly, 
doctrines providing relief from forfeiture developed in Chancery alongside 
the penalty doctrine and were available for parties who failed to fully 
perform their obligations under the bond.64 So too, courts of chancery limited 
the bondholder to “just compensation” for nonperformance under the bond, 
finding that permitting the creditor to recover more than what it had lost by 
non-performance of the condition was “unconscionable.” In time, courts of 
equity adopted the presumption that penalty bonds should be set aside 
whenever their enforcement created an unacceptable risk of oppression and 
extortion.65 
 
 61. W.T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 9, 85 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1914). In an action in covenant brought by a 
bond holder in possession of the bond, the common law courts simply could not entertain a defense that 
allowed the promisor to prove satisfaction of the condition absent an acquittance. Even if the court 
suspected that by seeking to enforce the bond the bond holder was fraudulently misrepresenting that the 
condition had not been satisfied, the court had to enforce the bond anyway. Id.  
 62. In the case of bonds evidencing a loan from the bond holder to the promisor, debtors often 
sought to avoid paying twice by filing a petition for relief in a court of equity, which the Chancellor 
granted if “after such examination right may be done [the debtor] as reason and conscience require.” Id. 
at 88. The potential for such injustice was dramatically exacerbated by the common practice in which 
borrowers seeking more favorable terms from their lender knowingly signed bonds for double the amount 
of their loan in order to give their lender the right to impose a penalty in the event of default. A debtor 
who signed such a “penalty” bond, and paid back the debt it evidenced without receiving the bond or an 
acquittance in return, could be subject to a triple payment of the face amount of the debt even though the 
lender had fraudulently represented that the debtor was in default. Id. at 89. 
 63. See 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 292–93 (1924). In addition to granting 
relief to the obligor from fraud, courts of equity also invalidated bonds upon a finding that the obligor 
was illiterate or under duress or suffering mental incapacity. Here then we also find the origins of the 
modern contract rules that regulate the fairness of the bargaining process. BAKER, supra note 54, at 325. 
 64. Courts of chancery developed the maxim that “equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a 
penalty or forfeiture where compensation is made.” Id. at 326. 
 65. Id. at 325. The doctrine of substantive unconscionability can be traced to these early efforts by 
courts of equity to limit the abuses of penal bonds.  
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2.  The Rise of the Bargained-for Executory Promise 
i.  The Industrial Revolution and Emergence of the Ex Ante Perspective 
The simple action for debt, supplemented by the use of formal 
instruments such as the penal bond, sufficed to facilitate mutually beneficial 
contracting activity from early common law through the eighteenth 
century.66 But the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century saw a 
dramatic expansion of commercial enterprises and transactions, which in 
turn generated new risks of unprecedented scale. The cumbersome and rigid 
practice of issuing double bonds simply fell short of the need to manage the 
new uncertainties facing commercial parties. In this novel environment, 
parties needed better control over the process of allocating risk and reward: 
they needed to shape their particular transaction by taking the contract into 
their own hands. To manage their risks, therefore, commercial actors began 
to innovate by creating stock and commodities contracts that used executory 
promises to trade the risks of future price fluctuations.67 To give effect to the 
parties’ ex ante risk allocations in these new forms of contracts, common law 
courts for the first time began to award market-based damages for failure to 
deliver stock certificates in a rising market68 and for the breach of fixed-price 
forward contracts for the delivery of commodities.69 
As these executory contracts became more common, courts for the first 
time granted sellers the right to resell the contract goods upon the buyer’s 
rejection and then seek market damages—the difference between the 
contract and resale prices.70 Although intertwined with the common law’s 
traditional equitable language of justice and fairness, the first court to create 
the market damages default rule for executory contracts relied on the goal of 
vindicating the parties’ presumed intent to maximize their contract’s ex ante 
value: 
 
 66. During this period, commercial parties used sealed penal bonds and bills of exchange as the 
primary substitute for legally binding executory contracts. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 928; see also 
Simpson, supra note 53. 
 67. This Part of the Article draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options 
and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1436–47 (2004); see 
also Horwitz, supra note 44, at 921–22 (arguing that enforcement of executory promises did not occur 
until the rise of industrialization and the development of commercial markets in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries). Horwitz’s basic thesis—that prior to the industrial revolution the common 
law of contract was dominated by notions of equity and fairness and that it was thereafter adapted to 
legitimate the inequalities of the nineteenth century market economy—has been vigorously contested. 
See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 
(1979). Simpson’s critique does not, however, challenge the basic point that courts did not regularly 
enforce executory contracts until the nineteenth century. We rely on Horwitz's historical account only to 
the extent that it survives Simpson's critique. 
 68. See, e.g., Groves v. Graves, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 1 (1790). 
 69. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Hampton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 200 (1818). 
 70. See Sands & Crump v. Taylor & Lovett, 5 Johns. 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
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This [market damages] rule operates justly as respects both parties; for the 
reasons which induced the one party to refuse the acceptance of the 
property will induce the other to act fairly, and to sell it to the best 
advantage. It is a much fitter rule than to require it of the party, on whom 
the possession of the thing is thrown . . . to suffer the property to perish, 
as a condition on which his right to damages is to depend . . . . [This rule] 
appears to me to be founded on principles dictated by good sense and 
justice. 
The article was perishable, and the interest of all parties required that the 
most should be made of it. Nothing, therefore, is more reasonable, than 
that the plaintiffs, who were not bound to store or purchase the wheat, 
should be permitted to sell it at the best price that could be obtained.  
[The market damages rule] is convenient and reasonable, and for the best 
interest of both parties . . . . The vendor ought to have the benefit of that 
principle as well as the vendee. It would be unreasonable to oblige him to 
let the article perish on his hands, and run the risk of the solvency of the 
buyer.71 
The court’s reasoning suggests that it believed the parties would not 
have intended a forward contract in which the seller would be required to 
allow rejected goods to waste instead of preserving their value by reselling 
them, thereby reducing the damages from breach. The market damages 
default rule thus gave effect to the parties’ ex ante intent to create a contract 
that efficiently allocated market risks.72 
To manage the risks of the new mass markets of the industrial age, 
common law courts began to adopt additional default rules that allocated 
non-price risks between the parties in the ex ante contract. Courts adopted 
the rule awarding market damages for non-performance of stock and 
commodities transactions as the default rule for all executory contracts that 
parties made to implement their objectives. From this development evolved 
the origins of the bargain principle and the American doctrine of 
 
 71. Id. at 406, 409–10. Under the older common law rule, the seller would have been required to 
tender the contract goods and sue for the contract price. But in Sands, the seller covered on the market by 
reselling the goods to a third party and then sought damages based upon the contract-market differential. 
The court conceded that this was a case of first impression in America and granted market damages to 
the plaintiff. Id. at 405–06. 
 72. In addition to formulating a damages default, the courts during this period developed more 
clearly the principle that the “contract itself furnishes the measure of damages.” SEDGWICK, supra note 
53, at 200–01. Mid-nineteenth century contract law thus distinguished and rejected a line of earlier cases 
that gave the jury wide latitude and discretionary authority to determine the measure of damages, either 
by reducing or enlarging the award. The amount of compensation was now regulated by the direction of 
the courts, and the sole object was to ascertain the agreement of the parties, which controlled the measure 
of damages. Id. Among other things, this principle was an explicit rejection of the concept of breach as 
“fault.” The motives behind the breach were irrelevant. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, 2 THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 443 (1855). 
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consideration.73 The evolution from commodities and stock transactions to 
fully executory contracts led to one of the principal default rules designed to 
reduce the risks of contracting. Based on the parties’ presumed intent to 
maximize the expected value of their contracts, courts assigned to the 
promisor, by default, the risks associated with any performance under the 
contract, because courts implicitly presumed that the promisor was better 
able to reduce the expected losses caused by unanticipated contingencies.74 
Other default rules evolved during this period to protect the utility of market 
contracts as mechanisms for reducing the incidence of interparty haggling75 
and enhancing expected surplus, including the perfect tender rule for sales 
of goods,76 the common law indefiniteness doctrine,77 and the many default 
rules governing the process of offer and acceptance of terms.78 Contract 
thereafter became an instrument for managing risks ex ante through 
executory contracts.79   
 
 73. The bargain theory of consideration departed from the earlier common law definition of 
consideration as consisting of any benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promise. The theory limiting 
consideration to bargained for exchange of a promise or performance was a direct result of the market 
transactions described in the text. J. Willard Hurst observed that the bargain idea of consideration emerged 
as a method of market control, a legal technique employed by common law courts to regulate the market 
transactions that were emerging in the early nineteenth century. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 11–13 (1956). While many of 
these economic conditions existed in England prior to the colonial era, the unique combination of “legal 
heritage, challenge, opportunity, and individual motivation was irrepressible” in America and resulted in 
an “explosion of contract behavior.” Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued 
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1975). 
 74. This “performer’s risk” default rule is justified on the ground that the promisor is better able 
to exercise some degree of control over the manner of its performance under the contract, either by taking 
precautions to reduce the risk of an unanticipated occurrence or to take steps to reduce its impact should 
it occur. This default risk allocation imposes no injustice on the promisor since the “premium” for bearing 
the risks of performance are paid for by the promisee in the contract price. For discussion, see ROBERT 
E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 74–94 (5th ed. 2013).  
 75. The judicial instinct to reduce interparty haggling (that undermines the expected value of the 
contract) explains the role of the obligation of good faith in American contract law. Under common law 
and the Uniform Commercial Code, the obligation of good faith is an interpretive principle and not a free-
standing independent duty. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt.1. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2018). Thus, courts assume as a default presumption that both parties would agree to act with each other 
in good faith to implement their agreement. This commitment deters strategic behavior which otherwise 
would generate a value-destroying race to the bottom. We develop his point further in Section III.D infra. 
 76. See, e.g., Beals v. Hirsch, 211 N.Y.S. 293, 300 (App. Div. 1925) (“[T]he seller is bound to 
tender the amount of goods contracted for in order to hold the buyer for performance.”), aff’d, 152 N.E. 
414 (1926); Reuter v. Sala, 27 W. R. [1879]. 
 77. See, e.g., Shepard v. Carpenter, 55 N.W. 906 (Minn. 1893). The indefiniteness doctrine 
instructed courts to declare contracts void for indefiniteness if the parties failed to specify the outcome 
for realized states of the world. 
 78. See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. Jones, 20 Va. 83 (1818); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1892] 1 QB 
256 (Eng.); Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250. For discussion, see Arthur L. Corbin, Offer 
and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917). 
 79. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 919.  
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ii.  Justifying Default Rules on the Basis of Ex Ante Intent 
Over the next one hundred years, as the industrial revolution took hold 
first in England and then in the United States, courts developed a 
hypothetical bargain justification for implying default terms as part of a 
common law court’s responsibility to interpret the parties’ agreement. In 
1863, in Taylor v. Caldwell, Justice Blackburn explained the emerging 
impossibility default rule as follows: 
[T]his implication [of an excusing condition] tends to further the great 
object of making the legal construction such as to fulfil [sic.] the intention 
of those who entered into the contract. For in the course of affairs men in 
making such contracts in general would, if it were brought to their minds, 
say that there should be such a condition.80 
Subsequently, in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes generalized the ex ante reasoning in Taylor.81 
Courts, he explained, should fill gaps with rules that would facilitate 
bargained for exchanges between future parties that are similar to the parties 
before the court: 
It is true that, as people when contracting contemplate performance, not 
breach, they commonly say little or nothing as to what shall happen in the 
latter event, and the common rules have been worked out by common 
sense, which has established what the parties probably would have said if 
they had spoken about the matter. But a man never can be absolutely 
certain of performing any contract when the time of performance arrives, 
and, in many cases, he obviously is taking the risk of an event which is 
wholly, or to an appreciable extent, beyond his control. The extent of 
liability in such cases is likely to be within his contemplation, and, 
whether it is or not, should be worked out on terms which it fairly may be 
presumed he would have assented to if they had been presented to his 
mind.82 
Thus, the motivating objective of judicial default rules was to allocate 
risks that the parties had failed to consider in the same way the parties would 
have allocated those risks had they bargained over the matter explicitly at the 
time they formed their agreement. By filling contractual gaps in this way, 
courts maximized the chances that these default risk allocations would 
reflect the preferred risk allocations of future parties similar to those in the 
originating case. 
 
 80. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (emphasis added). 
 81. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903). 
 82. Id. at 543 (1903) (emphasis added). Some years later, Justice Cardozo used the same reasoning 
in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921), to adopt the rule of substantial performance 
in construction cases on the grounds that “intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in 
contemplation the reasonable and probable.” 
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In retrospect, it is easy to see why the decisions by courts at the dawn 
of the nineteenth century to legally enforce wholly executory agreements 
was such a watershed event in the development of American contract law. 
The dam burst thereafter, followed by a flood of innovative decisions by 
common law courts responding to the demands of commercial parties for a 
robust contract law. As courts continued to enforce executory promises, they 
developed by necessity novel doctrines (including the array of default rules) 
that were self-consciously designed to advance the objectives the parties 
intended their contracts to serve at the time of formation. As the judicial 
focus on ex ante intentions began to wax, the relevance of ex post equity 
began to wane. 
B.  THE PRIMACY OF THE LAW OVER EQUITY 
1.  Law and Equity at Common Law 
As the common law courts embraced the goal of vindicating the 
contracting parties’ ex ante intentions throughout the nineteenth century, the 
clash between this ex ante perspective and the ex post perspective of 
common law equity was inevitable. The English common law had managed 
to avoid the general tension between law and equity by creating two separate 
sets of doctrines adjudicated in separate courts.83 The first originated in the 
English King’s Bench and consisted of rules cast in objective terms. The 
second consisted of equitable principles originating in the English Court of 
Chancery, which provided an independent and alternative forum as a 
response both to the procedural constraints imposed on the common law 
courts and to the strict, rule-bound inclinations of common law judges.84 
These equitable interventions were not meant to, and did not, displace any 
of the common law rules. Indeed, for many years the Chancery’s decrees had 
no formal precedential effect,85 which freed the Chancery from any concern 
that its ex post rulings could undermine the consistency and predictability of 
adjudication.86 
 
 83. The discussion in this part draws on Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the 
Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1037–41 (2009). 
 84. BAKER, supra note 54, at 104; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 320.  
 85. “In Chancery, each case turned on its own facts, and the Chancellor did not interfere with the 
general rules observed in courts of law. The decrees operated in personam; they were binding on the 
parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding anyone else.” BAKER, supra note 54, at 
104. “So long as chancellors were seen as providing ad hoc remedies in individual cases, there was no 
question of their jurisdiction bringing about legal change or making law.” Id. at 202. 
 86. As an example, though common law courts continued strictly enforcing penalty clauses in 
breached contracts, equity courts began enjoining such enforcement in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, creating the doctrine “equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or forfeiture, where 
compensation can be made.” LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 324. 
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The premise of equitable jurisdiction was that justice sometimes 
required courts of equity to make exceptions to the legal rules applied by the 
courts of law, which assessed justice ex ante, from the point of view of the 
parties at the time of formation.87 In contrast, chancellors in equity assessed 
the justice of the outcome of contract disputes ex post, at the time of 
adjudication. Courts of equity thus were free to determine that the resolution 
of a dispute according to the legal rules was inconsistent with the parties’ 
intended objectives because of unanticipated contingencies that occurred 
after formation. In such cases, courts of equity could set aside the legal 
resolution of the dispute and use equitable principles to (re)align the contract 
with the parties’ originally intended purposes.88 
2.  The Common Law Absorbs Most of Equity 
Historically, the jurisdictional division between the common law courts 
and the Court of Chancery acted as a barrier between the two incompatible 
regimes. In the nineteenth century, however, the Chancery was eliminated, 
and law and equity was merged in both England and the United States. This 
awkward amalgam confronted courts as they began to develop a modern 
American contract law.89 The tension between the ex ante and ex post was 
largely mitigated by the practice of American common law courts of 
absorbing most of the equitable doctrines that had developed in Chancery 
and then transforming them to suit the ex ante perspective.90 As we explain 
below, the First Restatement of Contracts reinforced the ex ante perspective 
by cabining the historically equitable doctrines into legal doctrines 
governing fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation,91 fraudulent non-
 
 87. The ex ante approach of the common law courts was summarized in Waberley v. Cockerel 
(1542) 73 Eng. Rep. 112, 113: 
[I]t is better to suffer a mischief to one man than an inconvenience to many, which would 
subvert a law: for if matter in writing may be so easily defeated, and avoided by such surmise 
and naked breath, a matter in writing would be of no greater authority than a matter of fact . . . .  
 88. As Baker explains, “the essence of equity as a corrective to the rigour of law was that it should 
not be tied to rules. If, on the other hand, no consistent principles whatever were observed, parties in like 
cases would not be treated alike; and equality was a requisite of equity.” BAKER, supra note 54, at 109. 
 89. Ironically, by the nineteenth century, the Chancery had developed a set of procedures more 
arcane and burdensome than the common law procedures it originally sought to mitigate. The resulting 
administrative delay, combined with corruption born of the Chancery’s practice of paying clerks on a fee 
basis rather than salary, ultimately led to the Chancery’s demise. Id. at 111–12. Soon thereafter law and 
equity were merged. Id. at 114. 
 90. DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 203 (1999). 
In general, equity-evolved contract doctrines designed to provide far broader protection against perceived 
fraud than the common law provided. In particular, the core equitable contract doctrines provided relief 
where an agreement was not fully voluntary or informed. Id. at 208. 
 91. The equitable defenses of negligent or innocent misrepresentation were the precursors to the 
contemporary doctrines of fraudulent and material misrepresentation. Id. at 208; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
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disclosure,92 unilateral and mutual mistake,93 and specific performance and 
other injunctive relief.94 Yet, a few of the equitable doctrines absorbed into 
modern American contract law could not be similarly transformed to 
accommodate the ex ante perspective. Courts had designed these ex post 
doctrines, such as the just compensation, penalty,95 hardship, and forfeiture96 
doctrines, specifically to vitiate clear common law rules. 
Because these vestigial ex post doctrines undermined contracting 
parties’ ex ante intentions, courts only infrequently invoked them. 
Nevertheless, this occasional validation of the ex post perspective increased 
the risk of more pervasive equitable interventions. The First Restatement of 
Contracts, however, significantly reduced this risk. The Reporter of the First 
Restatement, Samuel Williston, sought to formalize and render coherent the 
diverse legal and equitable doctrines comprising the common law of 
contract.97 Williston’s Restatement formally incorporated the historically 
equitable doctrines into the common law of contract as exceptions to the 
 
 92. The equity defense of wrongful silence was the precursor to contemporary non-disclosure 
doctrine. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 93. IBBETSON, supra note 90, at 210.  
 94. Id. at 206, 213; BAKER, supra note 54, at 320. 
 95. The courts initially seized on the “intent of the parties” as the key to distinguishing liquidated 
damages and penalties. An invalid penalty was a sum intended only as security for the performance of 
the executory promise and not intended to be paid. Enforceable liquidated damages, on the other hand, 
were intended to be paid by the promisor if she elected not to perform the agreement. SEDGEWICK, supra 
note 53, at 398–420 (collecting cases). Subsequently, in a much-cited opinion, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858), rejected the intent test of enforceability. Instead, the 
court held that the governing principle was that damages must be based on “the principle of just 
compensation for the loss or injury actually sustained.” Id. at 133. The court held that the task for the 
parties was to specify just compensation ex ante in those instances where they had a comparative 
advantage over a court seeking to do so ex post. Such comparative advantage would exist where the 
provable loss from the breach of the contract was uncertain, remote, or speculative. While Jaquith 
purported to restrict party sovereignty over stipulated damages, the Jaquith rule actually gave substantial 
latitude to nineteenth century contracting parties. Given the then-prevailing view that lost profits could 
not be recovered because they were too remote or speculative, the anticipated losses in most commercial 
contracts would be difficult to prove. Consequently, parties had considerable freedom to stipulate 
damages under the Jaquith rule. For further discussion of the evolution of the contemporary penalty 
doctrine, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1436–47. 
 96. The forfeiture doctrine is another example of a pre-modern equitable doctrine that has survived 
the merger of law and equity. BAKER, supra note 54, at 202–03. The forfeiture doctrine authorizes courts 
to set aside implied and express conditions under certain circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 229 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). We critique the forfeiture doctrine in Section III.B infra. 
 97. Williston’s formalism rested on several basic claims: that contract terms could be interpreted 
ex ante according to their ordinary meaning, and that written terms (and thus the parties’ intended means) 
have priority over unwritten expressions of agreement (that might better reveal their intended ends). In 
particular, Williston elevated the parol evidence and plain meaning rules as mechanisms for cabining 
equitable interventions by courts interpreting disputed contracts. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 631 (3d ed. 1979) (“The parol evidence rule requires, in the absence of fraud, 
duress, mutual mistake or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, 
where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing.”). For discussion, see Dennis M. 
Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 186–88 (1989). 
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common law rules that applied only in specific circumstances. As a result, 
the judicial evolution of novel equitable exceptions largely came to a halt.98 
By enshrining these views in the First Restatement, Williston’s 
reformulation significantly influenced the subsequent adoption of contract 
doctrine by state courts as they decided contract disputes.99 
The formalist consensus that followed in the wake of the First 
Restatement minimized the perceived judicial license to exercise equitable 
discretion in contracts cases. Notably, despite the effort of subsequent 
private law makers to reframe this consensus in the Second Restatement, the 
Willistonian resolution of the law-equity dialectic remains today the 
dominant approach in American contract law, endorsed by courts in the large 
majority of states.100 The majority of common law courts now understand 
and apply contract law to support contracting parties’ ability to choose ex 
ante their contractual means for maximizing the expected value of their 
contracts. 
C.  THE DOMINANCE OF THE EX ANTE IN MODERN CONTRACT LAW 
The preceding review of the history of the American common law of 
contracts highlights the explicitly ex ante reasoning judges have used over 
two centuries to explain the decisions creating its bedrock doctrines. As 
noted above, when common law courts began to resolve disputes over 
executory contracts that lacked express terms governing those disputes, they 
confronted the necessity of creating default terms to allocate unexpected 
risks. The common rationale given by courts to justify their default rules was 
that the disputing parties would have agreed to the same risk allocation had 
they been required to bargain over that matter at the time of contracting. 
But how did the common law courts decide just how the parties would 
have allocated any given risk? The answer is that courts reasoned, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that most parties intend to minimize the expected 
costs of contracting in order to maximize their contract’s ex ante value. The 
judicial rationale supporting this reasoning is that both parties are equally 
 
 98. See Patterson, supra note 97, at 169–70. 
 99. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 100. A large majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional, formalist approach to contract 
interpretation that preferences the chosen means to achieve their purposes that parties reflect in their 
written agreements. A state-by-state survey of recent court decisions shows that thirty-eight states follow 
the traditional textualist approach to interpretation. Nine states, joined by the Uniform Commercial Code 
for sales cases (hereinafter UCC) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, have adopted a contextualist 
or anti-formalist interpretive regime. The remainder are indeterminate. See State-by-State Survey (on file 
with authors). But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All but 
Best-Tool-For-The-Job, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.1625 (2017) (recent state survey finds a number of states 
have adopted an intermediate position on the text versus context debate). 
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motivated ex ante to reduce the collective costs of bearing the risks of their 
contractual venture. Based on this premise, courts allocated contractual risks 
by default to the party better able to bear them.101 The justification for this 
risk assignment is that the party to whom the risk is allocated will (in 
exchange for a compensating payment) agree to bear the risks that she is best 
able to reduce (or insure against) by taking appropriate precautions. Both 
parties gain by acting to make the inevitable risks of contracting smaller than 
they otherwise would be, thereby enhancing the expected value of their 
collaborative enterprise. In this way, each contracting party can act as an 
insurer of the promises it gives to the other, and the parties implicitly 
impound the “premium” for this insurance in the price for the goods or 
services provided under the contract.102 Thus, given the assumption that 
parties intend to maximize the expected value of their contracts, these 
defaults are the risk allocations that most parties would intend to incorporate 
into their agreements. 
The evolutionary story we have just described supports the claim that 
virtually all of the American common law of contracts derives from two 
premises: the purpose of contract law is to discover and enforce the parties’ 
ex ante intent and most parties intend to maximize the expected value of their 
contracts at the time they form them. There are many accounts in the 
literature of how this ex ante perspective on optimal risk-bearing explains 
the outcomes of American common law contract cases.103 The explanatory 
power of that perspective even accommodates doctrines such as the duty to 
 
 101. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 102. This risk reduction principle is one of the oldest default rules in contract law, tracing its lineage 
to Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897; see supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 103. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 
YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and 
Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49; Richard Craswell, Contract 
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & 
Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. 
L. REV. 967 (1983) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle]; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE. L.J. 1261 (1980); Goetz 
& Scott, supra note 4; Thomas H. Jackson, “Anticipatory Repudiation” and the Temporal Element of 
Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 
31 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1978); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of 
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, 
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific 
Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Alan Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1976); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).  
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mitigate104 and the widespread practice of relational contracting105 that 
appear at first blush to challenge the primacy of the ex ante perspective. The 
personal sovereignty view of contracts not only demonstrates that these 
analyses largely succeed, but also argues that their success serves as the 
cornerstone of a genuine interpretive theory of American contract law. The 
best interpretation of contract doctrine understands its sole purpose to be the 
vindication of the personal sovereignty of contracting parties by supporting 
their presumed ex ante intentions. 
*** 
The history and content of American contract law reveals the singular 
evolution of common law doctrine towards a wholesale embrace of the ex 
ante perspective, a perspective that carves out “a domain or territory in which 
the self is sovereign.”106 However, the same history also shows continuing, 
albeit limited, instances where ex post doctrines are used to trump the parties 
ex ante choices, even those that are made freely under fair conditions. In our 
view, such instances are pathological. These ex post interventions are 
inconsistent with a robust conception of personal sovereignty in which 
 
 104. At first blush, the mitigation doctrine appears to be an ex post obligation imposed on the 
nonbreaching party. But to the contrary, this doctrine is clearly congruent with the claim that contract law 
supports the parties’ ex ante choice to impose on each other an ex post obligation for the purpose of 
maximizing the expected value of the contract. Although some contract theorists view the mitigation 
doctrine as deeply incompatible with respect for the parties’ promissory moral commitments, see 
generally, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
708 (2007), the doctrine actually reflects the parties own most likely understanding of the ex post 
obligations each agreed to undertake at the time of formation, see Kraus, supra note 11, at 1638. Contract 
law’s mitigation doctrine anticipates that parties will agree ex ante to extend efforts in sharing information 
and undertaking subsequent adaptations as necessary to minimize the expected joint costs of adverse 
future events, even when those events lead one of the parties to breach. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation 
Principle, supra note 103. 
 105. One reason parties enter relational contracts is to avoid disruption and the spillover effects of 
volatility. In output and requirements contracts, for example, they achieve this objective by having each 
party agree ex ante to trade off some of the upside of a future market movement in their favor in return 
for more protection on the downside. Their stated goal is to keep both parties “in the money” at every 
period over the life of the contract. By enforcing these agreements despite the parties’ reliance on vague 
standards of performance, courts might create the impression that their primary goal is to provide ex post 
justice by limiting opportunism. But the judicial enforcement of relational contracts is better explained 
by the parties’ ex ante intent to use the relational bonds that repeated interactions create to maximize the 
expected value of their contracts. By reinforcing informal norms of trust and reducing volatility, the 
parties reduce the “haggling” that can result from period to period efforts to extract maximum individual 
gains. Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 337 (1980). By assigning discretion ex ante to the party who values it more, and constraining 
that discretion through both formal and informal mechanisms, the parties can “smooth the bumps” that 
otherwise impose spillover costs that impair contract value. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10. The 
motivation of courts to require cooperative adjustment in relational contracts need not be attributed to 
policing opportunism ex post at the expense of the parties’ ex ante intentions. Rather, it is more naturally 
attributed to the contracting parties’ presumed intent simply to deploy informally enforced norms of trust 
and fairness to regulate their contractual conduct. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-
Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2040–42 (1987). 
 106. FEINBERG, supra note 11, at 52. 
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“respect for a person’s autonomy is respect for his unfettered voluntary 
choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the 
interests of others need protection from him.”107 The question, then, is 
whether the personal sovereignty view better explains American contract law 
than a pluralist account that purports to accommodate both the ex ante and 
ex post perspectives. We turn to that question in Part II. 
II.  PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS PLURALISM 
The examination of the history and content of the modern American 
common law of contract grounds our claim that its sole purpose is to 
vindicate personal sovereignty as embodied in the ex ante intentions 
expressed by contracting parties under free and fair conditions. In this Part, 
we set out the general criteria of adequacy for explanatory legal theories and 
then explain why the personal sovereignty account satisfies these criteria 
better than pluralism, its chief competitor. 
A.  LEGAL EXPLANATION, PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND PLURALISM 
The nature of legal explanation has been hotly contested over the last 
century, dating back at least to the publication of H.L.A Hart’s The Concept 
of Law.108 For present purposes, however, we rely on Ronald Dworkin’s 
theory of legal interpretation because it provides a well-known, accessible, 
and plausible starting point for understanding the criteria governing an 
explanatory theory of law.109 Dworkin equates legal explanation with what 
he calls “constructive interpretation.”110 For Dworkin, a constructive 
interpretation has three stages. The first is the “pre-interpretive” stage, in 
which the legal objects of inquiry to be interpreted are preliminarily 
identified, such as cases, rules, principles, statutes, and the like. The second 
is the “interpretive” stage, in which participants in the practice of law attempt 
to identify purposes that the practice of law purports to serve in the legal 
sources identified at the pre-interpretive stage. For Dworkin, two 
considerations guide interpretation. First, the interpreter must seek an 
interpretation that casts the law in its best moral light by holding it to be 
serving the best moral purpose possible.111 As Dworkin describes it, “the 
 
 107. Id. at 68. 
 108. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
 109. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 110. See id. at 65–68. This section draws on Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: 
Groundwork for the Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, in 1 LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
385 (Enrique Villanueva ed., 2002), and Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law 
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287 (2007).  
 111. As Stephen Perry explains this requirement,  
[t]his involves showing how the practice, construed in terms of a certain point or function that 
might plausibly be attributed to it, could under specified conditions give rise to moral 
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interpreter settles on some general justification for the main elements of the 
practice identified at the preinterpretive stage. This will consist of an 
argument why a practice of that general shape is worth pursuing, if it is.”112 
Second, the interpreter seeks an interpretation that meets a “threshold” of fit 
with the legal sources being interpreted.113 The third is the “post-
interpretive” stage, in which the interpreter “adjusts his sense of what the 
practice ‘really’ requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at 
the interpretive stage.”114 The best interpretation is therefore the one that 
constitutes the optimal trade-off between casting the law in its best moral 
light, in both the interpretive and post-interpretive stages, and “fitting” the 
legal sources that constitute the law as a preinterpretive matter. 
As the previous historical discussion has shown, the vast bulk of case 
law and the legally authoritative materials comprising the modern law of 
contract (contract law’s “preinterpretive” legal objects of inquiry) aim 
explicitly at vindicating the parties’ ex ante intent. At the conclusion of our 
interpretive stage, we conclude that the explanation that best fits the 
preinterpretive facts and casts contract law in its best moral light understands 
contract law’s exclusive purpose to be the vindication of personal 
sovereignty, even though this interpretation does not fit the ex post doctrines. 
In the Dworkinian framework, a lack of perfect fit between an interpretation 
and the legal “data” does not itself disqualify a candidate interpretation. 
Instead, the framework requires only that a proposed interpretation fit the 
preinterpretive data sufficiently “to count as an interpretation of it rather than 
the invention of something new.”115 As Dworkin explains, any interpretation 
that meets this threshold of fit qualifies as an acceptable candidate for the 
best interpretation of the legal practice in question: 
When an interpretation meets the threshold, remaining defects of fit may 
be compensated, in [the interpreter’s] overall judgment, if the principles 
of that interpretation are particularly attractive, because then he sets off 
the community’s infrequent lapses in respecting these principles against 
its virtue in generally observing them. The constraint fit imposes on 
substance, in any working theory, is therefore the constraint of one type of 
political conviction on another in the overall judgment which 
 
obligations for participants that they would not otherwise have. The idea is to make moral sense 
of the practice by showing people why and under what circumstances they might have reason 
to comply with it. 
Stephen R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, 4 LEGAL THEORY 427, 463 (1998). 
 112. DWORKIN, supra note 109, at 66. 
 113. Dworkin explains that “[c]onvictions about fit will provide a rough threshold requirement that 
an interpretation of some part of the law must meet if it is to be eligible at all.” Id. at 255. 
 114. Id. at 66. 
 115. Id. at 67. 
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interpretation makes a political record the best it can be overall, everything 
taken into account.116 
Given the near perfect level of fit between the personal sovereignty 
interpretation and the ex ante doctrines, the case for the personal sovereignty 
interpretation turns on whether it casts contract law overall in the best moral 
light possible, despite its lack of fit with the ex post doctrines, compared to 
the best available alternative interpretations. We argue that the personal 
sovereignty interpretation provides the most compelling moral justification 
available for the ex ante doctrines. In addition, because these doctrines 
comprise the vast majority of contract law itself, we conclude that contract 
law does not, in Dworkin’s terms, “really” include the ex post doctrines. 
Instead, the personal sovereignty interpretation treats them as legal error. In 
doing so, the personal sovereignty interpretation “sets off the [judicial] 
community’s infrequent lapses in respecting” the value of personal 
sovereignty in contract law “against its virtue in generally observing” it.117 
Moreover, our historical account of the origins and persistence of the 
ex post doctrines even casts the erroneous judicial practice of recognizing ex 
post doctrine in its best moral light. It shows how judges applied ex post 
doctrines out of a misguided respect for stare decisis and an understandable 
failure to appreciate that the newly formed ex ante core of contract law 
rendered the time-honored ex post norms of justice and fairness not merely 
vacuous, but perversely unjust and unfair to impose. Thus, by treating the ex 
post doctrines as legal error, the personal sovereignty interpretation renders 
the remaining doctrines of contract law internally coherent, consistent, and 
principled. It thereby meets the Dworkinian goal of constructing an 
interpretation that best realizes the ideal of (contract) law as integrity.118 
Dworkin’s theory of the correct interpretation of law, however, is 
comparative. It identifies the right interpretation with the best interpretation. 
The personal sovereignty interpretation of contract law is the right theory, 
then, only if there isn’t a better one. The chief rival to the personal 
sovereignty interpretation is pluralism. Pluralism claims that contract law 
serves multiple, competing values. Unlike the personal sovereignty 
interpretation, the pluralist interpretation fits both ex ante and ex post 
 
 116. Id. at 257. 
 117. Id. 
 118.  
When a judge declares that a particular principle is instinct in law, he reports . . . an interpretive 
proposal: that the principle both fits and justifies some complex part of legal practice, that it 
provides an attractive way to see, in the structure of that practice, the consistency of principle 
integrity requires.  
Id. at 228. For Dworkin’s understanding of the relationship between interpretations of law generally, and 
interpretations of particular “departments” of law, such as contract or tort law, see id. at 250–54.  
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doctrines. Instead of treating the ex post doctrines as legal error, pluralism 
explains them as just one among many kinds of doctrines vindicating 
multiple values that compete with, and sometimes trump, personal 
sovereignty. For pluralists, the purpose of contract law is to vindicate, and 
resolve conflicts between, the many competing values at stake in contract 
cases.119 Pluralists argue, therefore, that pluralism is superior to the personal 
sovereignty interpretation because only pluralism “fits” with the judicial and 
black letter practice of recognizing the ex post doctrines as legally valid.120 
In the remainder of this Part, we address the relative merits of the 
personal sovereignty and pluralist interpretations of contract law. We argue 
in Section II.B that the personal sovereignty interpretation achieves a better 
overall balance between the fit and moral light criteria than pluralism 
achieves. In Section II.C we consider the doctrines that pluralists cite as 
evidence that contract law vindicates multiple values rather than just the 
value of personal sovereignty. We show that, with the exception of the ex 
post doctrines, all of them vindicate personal sovereignty rather than some 
other value. We then consider the ex post doctrines in Section II.D and argue 
that they either vindicate no value at all, and perversely undermine justice 
between the parties, or serve to promote either paternalism or anti-
opportunism. We conclude that neither paternalism nor anti-opportunism can 
justify the existence of ex post doctrines, or the ex post perspective generally, 
in contract law. 
B.  PLURALISM AND FIT 
Pluralism’s superior fit with contract law does not provide a reason to 
prefer it over the personal sovereignty interpretation. This is because 
pluralism lacks the theoretical resources needed to identify as invalid one 
among multiple doctrines that may comprise contract law. Given that courts 
can and do make mistakes, one criterion of adequacy for explanatory legal 
theories is that they can, at least in principle, determine that doctrines long 
recognized as valid by legally authoritative sources are nonetheless 
invalid.121 Because pluralism fails this test, it begs the question against the 
 
 119. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, and accompanying text (setting out the principal pluralist 
claims). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 979 n.16 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“[F]or 40 years 
Congress has insisted on retaining a voice on individual suspension cases—it has frequently rejected bills 
which would place final authority in the Executive Branch.”); id. at 967 (“Today the Court not only 
invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 
200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a ‘legislative veto.’ ”); id. at 1002 (“[This 
decision] reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held by the Courts which 
sanctioned the modern administrative state. Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions 
in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history.”). 
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personal sovereignty interpretation, which concludes that the ex post 
doctrines are legally invalid, despite their preinterpretive status as legally 
valid contract doctrines. 
Moreover, pluralism is incapable of determining whether the best 
interpretation of an area of law should understand its purpose to be the 
vindication of multiple values, or the vindication of only one value, even 
though it erroneously includes some doctrines that vindicate other values. 
Put simply, pluralism cannot designate any doctrine as anomalous. In the 
end, pluralism makes the purely formal claim that an area of law vindicates 
more than one value, but lacks the theoretical resources to reject doctrines as 
invalid or to advance any substantive explanatory or normative claim beyond 
its assertion that an area of law has a value headcount of greater than one. 
C.  REFUTING DOCTRINAL EVIDENCE OF PLURALISM: POLICING THE 
BARGAIN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
There is widespread agreement, even among pluralists, that the ex ante 
perspective grounds many of the core doctrines of contract law. The law of 
offer and acceptance,122 the basis of contract in promise,123 the objective 
theory of intent,124 and the indefiniteness doctrine125 are just a few examples 
of contract rules clearly designed to facilitate the making, interpretation, and 
enforcement of agreements. Few would disagree that these and similar core 
structural components of contract law serve to vindicate some conception of 
individual autonomy. But contract law also contains a set of doctrines 
designed to “police” the bargains that give rise to agreements. If a bargain 
violates one of these doctrines, it might not be legally enforceable. These 
include the doctrines of capacity,126 duress,127 fraud,128 mistake,129 and 
procedural unconscionability. In this section, we explain why these doctrines 
clearly vindicate personal sovereignty rather than some competing value. 
1.  Policing the Bargain 
The capacity doctrine prevents enforcement of any agreement reached 
with an individual who does not qualify as a morally responsible agent 
because, for example, he or she is under the age of majority or mentally 
 
 122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18–70 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 123. See id. §§ 1–5. 
 124. See id. § 2. 
 125. See id. §§ 33–34. 
 126. See id. §§ 12–16. 
 127. See id. §§ 174–177. 
 128. See id. §§ 159–173. 
 129. See id. §§ 151–158. 
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incapacitated.130 The duress doctrine prevents enforcement of any agreement 
to which a party’s assent was not fully voluntary.131 The fraud doctrines, 
such as intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, prevent 
enforcement of any agreement induced by one party’s false assertions or 
efforts to prevent the other from discovering material truths regarding the 
subject matter of their agreement.132 The mistake doctrines prevent 
enforcement of apparent agreements in which one or both parties failed to 
understand the nature of the agreement, and so actually did not in fact reach 
any agreement.133 Finally, procedural unconscionability expands beyond the 
technical limits of the above doctrines to prevent enforcement of agreements 
reached under conditions in which one party took unfair advantage of the 
other. For example, it polices against actions taken for the sole purpose of 
deliberately misleading, discouraging, or preventing the other from 
discovering or understanding the true nature or value of their transaction.134 
The classic case is a seller using a pre-printed, standard sales form that states 
terms disadvantageous to the buyer in a smaller font than the other terms.135 
Taken together, these doctrines erect a bulwark to ensure that contract law 
respects the value of personal sovereignty by enforcing only agreements 
reached by morally responsible individuals under free and fair conditions. 
They certainly provide no support for the pluralist claim that contract law 
vindicates values other than personal sovereignty. 
2.  Social Justice 
Pluralists also cite another set of doctrines as evidence that contract law 
vindicates values that compete with individual autonomy and thus with 
personal sovereignty. These doctrines include illegality, immorality, and 
public policy.136 For the most part, each of these doctrines vindicates values 
that sound in what we have called social justice. In particular, they often 
prevent the enforcement of agreements reached under free and fair 
conditions that impose costs on third parties, or in the parlance of economics, 
cause “negative externalities.” For example, by voiding contracts for an 
illegal purpose, the illegality doctrine makes it more difficult for individuals 
to commit crimes, and many criminal laws prohibit activities that wrongfully 
harm others.137 To the extent that the illegality doctrine serves to prevent 
 
 130. See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 74, at 464–80. 
 131. Id. at 403–20.  
 132. Id. at 420–64. 
 133. Id. at 691–725. 
 134. Id. at 501–14. 
 135. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  
 136. For discussion, see SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 74, at 480–500. 
 137. See, e.g., Watts v. Malatesta, 186 N.E. 210 (N.Y. 1933). 
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such crimes, it serves social justice so understood.138 
Like the illegality and immorality doctrines, courts sometimes invoke 
public policy to invalidate bargains that would offend basic notions of human 
dignity, such as contracts for surrogacy, the sale of body parts, indentured 
servitude, torture, and the like.139 Some have argued that the public policy 
doctrine, when used as a ground to prohibit enforcement of such agreements, 
reinforces the value of individual autonomy by respecting the inalienable 
rights of autonomous individuals.140 Others have argued that respect for 
individual autonomy is, in principle, incompatible with the legal prohibition 
of these contracts because truly autonomous individuals are free to alienate 
their own autonomy.141 The compatibility of the public policy doctrine with 
respect for personal sovereignty thus turns on this debate over the 
foundations and limits of individual autonomy. But as with the illegality and 
immorality doctrines, the invalidation of such contracts can often be justified 
again on the ground that doing so is necessary to prevent harm to others not 
engaging in those activities (or because it is practically impossible to meet 
the extremely high standard for ensuring that such agreements are truly 
voluntary). The social “spillover effects” of these activities alone is likely to 
incentivize sufficiently harmful activity to justify these prohibitions. In short, 
 
 138. If there are so-called victimless crimes, as is conceivable, for example, for certain instances of 
prostitution, gambling, and suicide, then the illegality doctrine cannot be justified on the ground that it 
prevents harm to others. Legal prohibition of victimless crimes constitutes a form of legal moralism, 
which condones legislation that restricts individual liberty in order to vindicate a socially designated 
conception of the good. If the public policy doctrine refuses to enforce agreements because they further 
a purpose deemed immoral according to a designated social conception of the good, the doctrine is 
incompatible with respect for individual autonomy. But often, the same activities can be prohibited on 
the quite plausible ground that they are likely to cause widespread and serious harm to those not engaged 
in those activities, as is likely true of the most common forms of prostitution, gambling, and suicide. 
 139. See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Some courts and commentators justify 
invalidation of such contracts on the grounds of substantive unconscionability. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, cmt. c (“Theoretically it is possible for a contract to be oppressive taken 
as a whole, even though there is no weakness in the bargaining process . . . .”); Gillman v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988); see also Eisenberg, supra note 37. 
 140. The locus classicus for this position is JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 194–95 (Alburey 
Castell ed., 1947) (“The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, 
is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case . . . [B]y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates 
his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, 
the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself.”); see also David 
Archard, Freedom Not to be Free: The Case of the Slavery Contract in J. S. Mill's on Liberty, 40 PHIL. 
Q. 453 (1990); David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political [https://perma.cc/ZAG2-ANKY] (“Mill thinks that 
it is impermissible to contract into slavery and that paternalistic laws that prevent such contracts are not 
only permissible but obligatory.” (citing MILL, supra)).  
 141. The most influential contemporary defense of this position is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA 331 (1974) (“The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system 
will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would.”). See generally David Ellerman, 
Inalienable Rights: A Litmus Test for Liberal Theories of Justice, 29 LAW & PHIL. 571 (2010); J. 
Philmore, The Libertarian Case For Slavery, 14 PHIL. F. 43 (1982).  
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the illegality, immorality, and public policy doctrines are justified as 
reasonably necessary to prevent social harm, and therefore are, at least to 
that extent, fully compatible with respect for personal sovereignty. 
In sum, a careful examination of the doctrines pluralists cite as evidence 
that contract law pursues multiple purposes reveals that most of them 
actually ensure that contract law respects both individual autonomy and 
social justice. In our view, both of these kinds of doctrines support our claim 
that contract law is exclusively devoted to vindicating personal sovereignty. 
Obviously, the autonomy-respecting doctrines are fully compatible with the 
personal sovereignty account of contract law. However, the doctrines that 
serve social justice are also similarly harmonious with our claim that contract 
law is devoted exclusively to vindicating personal sovereignty. The value of 
personal sovereignty gives no license to engage in activities that create an 
unacceptable, material risk of harm to others. To be sure, there are many 
other areas of law that contain doctrines serving social justice, including tort 
and criminal law. But the existence of contract law itself makes the contract-
specific social justice doctrines necessary. Once the law of contract 
committed to respecting individual autonomy fully by empowering 
individuals to make legally enforceable agreements, social justice required 
that contract law itself include doctrines to confine its mandate to the limits 
of its own justification. The social justice contract doctrines, therefore, serve 
as constitutive components of the personal sovereignty regime, policing the 
boundaries of contract from within contract law itself. 
D.  REFUTING DOCTRINAL EVIDENCE OF PLURALISM: THE EX POST 
DOCTRINES 
Once the social justice contract doctrines are understood to be 
compatible with, rather than inconsistent with, the personal sovereignty 
interpretation of contract law, the case for pluralism rests entirely on the 
existence of the ex post doctrines. Pluralists often cite the penalty rule, the 
compensation principle, and the doctrines of forfeiture and excuse from 
hardship as examples of contract doctrines that vindicate values that compete 
with personal sovereignty.142 All of these doctrines claim to vindicate the 
value of ex post justice, which pluralists claim can override the value of 
personal sovereignty. 
There is no doubt that courts and other legally authoritative sources 
recognize these ex post doctrines, and these doctrines therefore qualify as 
part of the legal data for which interpretations of contract law must account. 
It is also clear that all of these doctrines originated long before the modern 
 
 142. See supra notes 15–28 and accompanying text. 
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transformation of American contract law, and that they served to police 
against abuses arising out of the widespread use of penal bonds to structure 
commercial transactions. In addition, it is equally clear that this rationale for 
the ex post doctrines ceased to exist after the creation of contract law’s 
extensive doctrinal apparatus for interpreting and enforcing executory 
agreements, which obviated the need for penal bonds. The question, then, is 
whether these doctrines have been judicially adapted to serve another valid 
purpose. 
1.  The Ex Post Doctrines and Social Justice 
Given that the ex post doctrines invite courts to vitiate the ex ante intent 
of the parties, it is natural to wonder whether they are actually part of contract 
law’s social justice doctrines. After all, social justice doctrines also serve to 
limit enforcement of agreements reached under free and fair conditions. But 
the common denominator among the ex post doctrines is that they are 
grounded solely in a concern to ensure what we have called “individual 
justice,” or justice and fairness between the parties. None purports to upset 
the parties’ intent in order to prevent harm to others. The compensation 
principle, the penalty doctrine, and the forfeiture doctrine claim to prevent 
an injustice or unfairness to one of the parties that would result from 
enforcement, not to prevent a social harm. 
Recall that a liquidated damages clause substantially in excess of (ex 
post) compensatory damages is treated as an unjust and unfair penalty to the 
breacher, and an unjust and unfair windfall to the non-breacher.143 Likewise, 
in Jacob & Youngs, I nc. v. Kent,144 an interpretation construing the owner’s 
obligation to pay the last progress payment as conditional on the builder’s 
perfect completion of the house is taken to impose an unjust and unfair 
forfeiture on the builder who tenders an imperfect house, and to confer an 
unjust and unfair windfall on the owner.145 These doctrines base their 
findings of injustice and unfairness on a normative evaluation of the 
distribution of gains and losses at the time of breach that would result from 
enforcing the ex ante agreement. According to this evaluation, a 
disproportionate distribution of gains and losses are taken to offend ex post 
principles of justice and fairness. The value served by the ex post contract 
doctrines, therefore, is certainly not a species of social justice. Instead, the 
ex post doctrines purport to be a species of individual justice, which 
 
 143. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 144. Jacob & Youngs, I nc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). For a critique of the conventional 
framing in the Jacob & Youngs case as constituting an unjust forfeiture for the homeowner and a windfall 
for the builder, see Kraus & Scott, supra note 83, at 1095–97; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8.  
 145. See supra note 27. 
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addresses the claims available to the parties for objecting to the effects on 
them of enforcing their own agreement. 
2.  The Ex Post Doctrines and Individual Justice: The Ex Post Fallacy 
No one disputes that enforcement of an agreement is individually just 
only if it was reached under free and fair conditions, and that the ex ante 
doctrines discussed above ensure that contract law enforces only these 
agreements. The ex post doctrines, however, imply that the ex ante doctrines 
set out the necessary but not sufficient conditions for securing individual 
justice. The ex post doctrines presuppose that individual justice has two 
prongs: the ex ante and the ex post. Thus, an agreement can be individually 
just when reached (because it was reached under free and fair conditions) but 
individually unjust to enforce at the time of adjudication, in light of events 
that occurred only after formation of the agreement. As the above examples 
demonstrate, the ex post doctrines are premised on the possibility that parties 
can consent under free and fair conditions to an agreement that turns out to 
violate the compensatory and proportionality criteria for justice and fairness 
at the time of adjudication. 
In our view, this two-prong understanding of individual justice is based 
on a conceptual confusion, which we call the ex post fallacy. This fallacy 
consists of the belief that the allocation of gains and losses between the 
parties that would result from enforcement at the time of adjudication is 
relevant to the individual justice and fairness of enforcing their agreement. 
The fallacy derives from the ubiquitous judicial practice of determining 
liability from the ex ante perspective but determining remedy from the ex 
post perspective. The common law has for centuries understood the justice 
and fairness of a remedy to be logically independent of the theory of legal 
liability. Thus, the legal remedy to which a plaintiff is entitled never turns on 
why the defendant was found legally responsible for causing harm to the 
plaintiff. For example, the remedy to which a plaintiff is entitled is the same 
whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a defendant’s negligent driving, 
libelous slander, or physical trespass. In every case, once the court 
determines that the defendant is liable, the ground for liability has no bearing 
on the remedy it imposes. The remedial objective in all cases is to restore the 
plaintiff to the position it was in before it suffered the harm caused by the 
defendant. A remedy is just and fair, using this approach, if and only if it 
requires the defendant to pay no more or less than is necessary to compensate 
the plaintiff for loss the defendant wrongfully caused. 
Unsurprisingly, courts accustomed to this intuitive and sound remedial 
framework for all common law claims prior to the transformation of 
American contract law have been inclined to take the same approach in 
  
2020] THE CASE AGAINST EQUITY IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 1359 
modern contract cases. They have presumed that the remedy to which a 
plaintiff is entitled is the same for harms caused by the defendant’s breach 
of contract as it is for harms caused by any other conduct for which the 
defendant is legally responsible, such as negligent conduct in tort or trespass 
in property. But unlike defendants who cause harm to plaintiffs through their 
negligence or trespass, defendants who cause harm to plaintiffs by breaching 
an agreement have always had the prior opportunity, when contemplating 
the possibility of breach, to agree with the plaintiff on the consequences to 
the defendant in the event of breach.146 Indeed, if the defendant paid the 
plaintiff in advance to agree that the plaintiff would be entitled to only half 
of any harm caused by the defendant’s breach, a remedy requiring the 
defendant pay the full harm caused by its breach would be unjust and unfair 
to both parties. It would be unjust and unfair to the defendant because it 
already paid to transfer the risk of half of any loss from breach to the plaintiff. 
And it would be unjust and unfair to allow the plaintiff both to receive a 
payment for assuming the risk of half the loss of any breach, and yet also to 
be reimbursed for the entire loss caused by breach.147 
 
 146. The ability of contracting parties to determine the remedy for breach ex ante, unlike tort 
victims, was forcefully made by Justice Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 
540, 543 (1903) (“When a man commits a tort, he incurs, by force of the law, a liability to damages, 
measured by certain rules. When a man makes a contract, he incurs, by force of the law, a liability to 
damages, unless a certain promised event comes to pass. But, unlike the case of torts, as the contract is 
by mutual consent, the parties themselves, expressly or by implication, fix the rule by which the damages 
are to be measured . . . . It is true that, as people when contracting contemplate performance, not breach, 
they commonly say little or nothing as to what shall happen in the latter event, and the common rules 
have been worked out by common sense, which has established what the parties probably would have 
said if they had spoken about the matter.” (emphasis added)). 
 147. Seana Shiffrin rejects the view that the common law bar against under or over-compensatory 
liquidated damage clauses should be viewed “as an anomalous historical remnant.” Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 412 (2016). 
She justifies the bar on the ground that it prevents contracting parties from “tread[ing] upon the traditional 
domain of the judiciary and on significant values associated with the rule of law. These other 
considerations should supersede appeals to the efficiency of the contracting relation and the ex ante 
agreements of the parties.” Id. at 413. According to Shiffrin, “values served by having the judiciary 
independently assess and mete out remedies,” as well as the need “to protect the reputation and the 
integrity of the judiciary as an impartial institution,” override the value of respecting the parties’ personal 
sovereignty by enforcing their ex ante remedial agreements. Id. at 421–22.  
“[W]hen remedial clauses are at issue, the judiciary’s role goes beyond that of protecting and 
facilitating autonomous agreements. If a remedial clause is at issue, then we have an abrogation 
of a legal duty, which implicates the rule of law, independent of the underlying purposes of the 
contract law. The parties’ own autonomy interests . . . [do] not suggest a reason to think that 
determining the public response to an abrogation of a legal duty also falls under their private 
control.”  
Id. at 435.  
  But the historical period during which the remediation for common law wrongs was the 
traditional domain of the judiciary almost entirely precedes the rise of executory contracts and the 
transformation of American contract law. Our claim is that Shiffrin’s argument—extending into the 
domain of modern American contract law the traditional common law conception of remedy as the 
exclusive province of the judiciary—exceeds its original rationale. Whereas the judicial determination of 
common law wrongs outside of modern American contract law still makes sense, there is no justification 
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Thus, in non-contract cases, although the ex ante perspective governs 
liability, only the ex post perspective governs remedy. But in contract cases, 
the agreement changes everything: the ex ante perspective governs the 
justice and fairness of both liability and remedy. Judicial recourse to the ex 
post perspective at the remedial phase of a contracts case is an 
understandable but mistaken instinct borne of the longstanding practice of 
determining remedies from the ex post perspective in all common law cases, 
a practice that pre-dates the transformation of American contract law. But 
the use of the ex post perspective to determine remedies for breach of 
contract under the modern law of contracts perversely undermines the goal 
of treating the parties justly and fairly. The ex post fallacy, then, is a product 
of the (understandable) failure of common law courts to appreciate the 
anachronism of the ex post perspective in modern contract law adjudication. 
Unfortunately, the ex post fallacy has led some courts to conform to a 
proportionality standard in the distribution of contractual gains and losses at 
the time of adjudication despite the parties’ ex ante contractual allocation of 
risks.148 The ex post fallacy has led to the assumption that disputes should 
be resolved, when possible, in order to avoid disproportionate gains and 
losses, even if the dispute is governed by an agreement in which both parties 
freely and fairly agreed to take the risk of precisely such an outcome.149 To 
be sure, these courts do not abrogate contractual terms outright in order to 
ensure conformity with an ex post proportionality standard. Rather, relying 
on doctrines governing forfeiture and excuse from hardship,150 they typically 
distort their interpretation of terms to avoid such outcomes, often by arguing 
that, despite clear language indicating otherwise, parties would not have 
agreed to such an unfairly disproportionate outcome.151 But if individual 
justice requires respect for the parties’ freely and fairly chosen contract 
terms, and these terms allocate the risk of a disproportionate outcome to a 
given party, then the resolution of a dispute according to those terms is not 
unjust to that party, even if it imposes on him the lion’s share of the 
contractual losses. 
In short, the ex post fallacy tempts courts to beg the question by 
 
for overriding the parties’ ex ante intent when they agree in their contract on the consequences of breach. 
Shiffrin’s justification—the need for courts to ensure the just remediation of wrongs—begs the question 
by presuming that enforcement of remedial clauses (to which the parties agreed under free and fair 
conditions) sometimes conflicts with the requirements of remedial justice. Her view rests, therefore, on 
the assumption that individual justice sometimes turns on ex post considerations. Our claim, however, is 
that there is no defensible ex post conception of individual justice.  
 148. See infra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. 
 149. See infra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 150. See infra notes 211–25 and accompanying text. 
 151. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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claiming that because disproportionate outcomes are necessarily unjust and 
unfair, they should presume that parties bargaining under fair conditions 
would not have agreed to take the risk of such an unjust outcome.152 But 
there is no reason to reject disproportionate outcomes of contracts formed 
under free and fair conditions as necessarily individually unjust and unfair. 
The justice and fairness of all contractual outcomes depend on the free and 
fair allocation of risks specified by the contract’s terms, not any objective 
characteristics of the distribution of gains and losses at the time of 
adjudication. 
3.  Ex Post Doctrines and Paternalism 
Individual justice does not turn on the relative distribution of gains and 
losses at the time of adjudication. It might turn, however, on the sheer 
magnitude of the harm that one party suffers as a result of a disproportionate 
outcome. Pluralists have claimed that by endorsing and applying ex post 
doctrines, courts are vindicating a paternalistic conception of individual 
good that licenses courts to override individual autonomy under the 
conditions provided for by the ex post doctrines.153 On this view, individual 
justice requires respect for both individual autonomy and an individual’s 
good, and contract law has doctrines that vindicate both. But whether such a 
view of contract law is coherent depends on the conceptions of individual 
autonomy and paternalism that contract law is taken to embrace. Joel 
Feinberg describes a “compromise” between autonomy and an individual’s 
own good that could coherently vindicate both values: 
[A] person’s own good in the vast majority of cases will be most reliably 
furthered if he is allowed to make his own choices in self-regarding 
matters, but when self-interest and self-determination do not coincide, one 
[could] simply do one’s best to balance autonomy against personal well-
being, and decide between them intuitively, since neither has automatic 
priority over the other.154 
 
 152. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1980) 
(holding that Alcoa’s failure to include a term reducing the risk of a wide disparity between contract and 
market prices “can only be understood to imply that the parties deemed the risk too remote and their 
meaning too clear to trifle with additional negotiation and drafting”); see also infra notes 212–26 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. As an example of such a claim, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (justifying the penalty rule and other ex post doctrines 
on the grounds of individuals’ propensity to err). 
 154. FEINBERG, supra note 11, at 59–60. Feinberg describes three other possible relationships 
between autonomy and paternalism, but none of them are open to the pluralist that claims contract law 
endorses the conception of autonomy vindicated by the ex ante doctrines as well as a conception of 
paternalism strong enough to account for the ex post doctrines’ capacity to override the ex ante doctrines. 
The first renders the right of self-determination “entirely derivative and instrumental. On this view, we 
may exercise a right to self-determination only because, and only insofar as, it promotes our good to do 
so.” Id. at 58. We presume that even the pluralist concedes that such a weak and empty conception of 
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The problem with this compromise position is that it must interpret the 
ex ante contract doctrines as vindicating a relatively weak conception of 
individual autonomy, compared to the personal sovereignty conception, and 
by doing so casts contract law in a less compelling moral light than the 
personal sovereignty interpretation. Feinberg explains that the personal 
sovereignty conception rejects this compromise because it “follows from a 
pure conception of individual sovereign autonomy, and anyone who holds 
such a conception, tacitly or explicitly, can find no appeal in—indeed is 
logically precluded from embracing—legal paternalism.”155 Thus, the 
compromise position “will not satisfy the liberal adherent of personal 
sovereignty since it restricts individual authority to some degree even in the 
wholly self-regarding domain. . . . [It] allows room for personal autonomy 
but does not conceive of it on the model of territorial sovereignty, since it 
permits it to be balanced against other considerations, and thereby deprives 
it of its trumping effect.”156 
We believe that contract law’s ex ante doctrines are most plausibly 
interpreted as vindicating an “underivative sovereign right of self-
determination,”157 one which “accords uniquely with a self-conception 
deeply imbedded in the moral attitudes of most people.”158 The pluralist who 
endorses the paternalistic interpretation of the ex post doctrines must insist 
on an interpretation of the ex ante contract doctrines that reject this powerful 
conception of individual autonomy in favor of one that allows a court to 
subordinate an individual’s own freely and fairly made choices to a court’s 
judgment of what would best serve that individual’s interests. American 
contract law, in our view, definitively rejects this view. We think Feinberg 
accurately captures the spirit of the modern American common law of 
 
individual autonomy cannot account for the breadth and depth of the express reasoning and application 
of the ex ante contract doctrines. The second takes the right of self-determination always to override 
concerns for an individual’s personal good (because overriding self-determination, as an empirical matter, 
will always be self-defeating given the psychological costs on doing so on the individual whose self-
determination is undermined). Id. at 59. This conception is obviously too strong for the pluralist, who 
insists that the ex post doctrines sometimes justify the overriding of ex ante intent, and thereby defeating 
the parties’ efforts at self-determination. The third version is the personal sovereignty conception, which 
gives no quarter to paternalism even in principle, and so, like the second version, cannot account for the 
capacity of ex post doctrines to override the parties’ intent. (“[This interpretation] that follows from a 
pure conception of individual sovereign autonomy, and anyone who holds such a conception . . . can find 
no appeal in—indeed is logically precluded from embracing—legal paternalism.”). Id. at 59. 
 155. Id.  at 59, 61 (“[A] person’s right of self-determination, being sovereign, takes precedence even 
over his own good. Interference in these cases is justified only when necessary to determine whether his 
choice is voluntary, hence truly his, or to protect him from choices that are not truly his; but interference 
with his informed and genuine choices is not justified to protect him from unwisely incurred or risked 
harms. He has a sovereign right to choose in a manner we think, plausibly enough, to be foolish, provided 
only that the choices are truly voluntary.”). 
 156. Id. at 60. 
 157. Id. at 61. 
 158. Id. at 61–62. 
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contract when he summarizes the conviction inherent in the personal 
sovereignty conception of individual autonomy: 
Even in the cases where the person subsequently regrets his choice, he 
may not regret that he had not been forcibly prevented from making it. 
There must be a right to err, to be mistaken, to decide foolishly, to take 
big risks, if there is to be any meaningful self-rule; without it, the whole 
idea of de jure autonomy begins to unravel.159 
The paternalistic interpretation of the value underlying the ex post 
contract doctrines requires the pluralist to deprive the vast majority of 
contract doctrines of their most powerful and intuitive moral justification—
the vindication of not merely any conception of individual autonomy, but of 
personal sovereignty. Given that the ex post doctrines comprise a small 
percentage of contract doctrine, and are directly applied only infrequently in 
litigation, this pluralist interpretation comes at too high a cost on the 
Dworkinian balance between the criteria of fit and best moral light. The 
personal sovereignty interpretation casts contract law in a far better moral 
light than this pluralist interpretation and more than compensates, in our 
view, for the relative sacrifice in fit required by treating ex post doctrines as 
understandable legal error rather than valid components of contract law. 
4.  Ex Post Doctrines and Opportunism 
The scholarly support for equity in general, and in contract law in 
particular, has experienced a gradual renaissance over the last several 
decades.160 Rather than grounding equity, and contract law’s ex post 
doctrines, in paternalism, these scholars claim these doctrines serve the 
purpose of preventing opportunism.161 Proponents of the anti-opportunism 
rationale for the ex post contract doctrines define “opportunism” in the 
contractual setting as 
 
 159. Id. at 62. Feinberg defines “de jure” autonomy as “the sovereign right of self-government” and 
contrasts it with “de facto” autonomy, which he defines as “the actual condition of self-government.” Id. 
at 65. 
 160. See, e.g., Ayotte, Friedman, & Smith, supra note 38; Cohen, supra note 38; Juliet P. Kostritsky, 
Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule 
for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2007); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of 
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981). On equity more generally, see also Henry E. Smith, Equitable 
Defences as Meta-Law, in DEFENCES IN EQUITY 17 (Paul S. Davies, Simon Douglas & James Goudkamp 
eds., 2018); Henry E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 173 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham eds., 2017); Yuval Feldman & Henry 
E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 137 (2014). 
 161. Unfortunately, the key concept of “opportunism” is notoriously difficult to define. Oliver 
Williamson, the father of the concept, defined it vaguely as “self-interest seeking with guile.” OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING 47 (1985). 
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a special case . . . that gets past other devices for dealing with it. 
Opportunism in general appears to contain an element of deceit because 
the opportunist takes unanticipated or unintended advantage of the law to 
the detriment of others . . . In the contractual context, its unanticipated or 
unintended nature takes the behavior out of the shared contemplation of 
the parties, but perhaps not out of the plans of the opportunist . . . . [T]he 
opportunist takes advantage of unusual knowledge about gaps in the 
contract or in the law. So opportunism is using the law (or contract) in a 
way that it is not intended, and can at most be anticipated in a general (and 
behavior-distorting) sense.162 
Our present inquiry is whether anti-opportunism provides a rationale 
for the ex post doctrines that leaves the pluralist in a stronger position than 
did their paternalist rationale. The anti-opportunism rationale does, in fact, 
purport to reconcile the ex post doctrines with respect for personal 
sovereignty. Scholars defending the “safety valve model of equity” argue 
that equity “has a role even in an area of law as centered on party autonomy 
and intent as contracts.”163 They claim that “opportunists are operating 
outside of the domain of what was actually contracted about.”164 No matter 
what contractual measures the parties might have taken to anticipate and 
prevent opportunism, those measures hold “only over the domain over which 
the parties contract, or, more accurately over the domain over which the 
parties can be expected to contract cost-effectively.”165 
The idea that contract terms are domain-specific is, in fact, the explicit 
premise of ex post doctrines, such as mutual mistake, commercial 
impracticability, and frustration of performance. As the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts defines them, each of these grounds of excuse from 
hardship is predicated on the possibility that 
[a]n extraordinary circumstance may make performance so vitally 
different from what was reasonably to be expected as to alter the essential 
nature of that performance. In such a case the court must determine 
whether justice requires a departure from the general rule that the obligor 
bear the risk that the contract may become more burdensome or less 
desirable. . . .  [T]he central inquiry is whether the non-occurrence of the 
circumstance was a ‘basic assumption on which the contract was 
made.’”166 
 
 162. Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38, at 25. George Cohen provides an alternative 
definition of “opportunism” in the contract setting as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to 
the other party’s reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or 
conventional morality.” Cohen, supra note 38, at 957. 
 163. Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38, at 29. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 30. 
 166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis 
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According to the “basic assumption” requirement, the ex post doctrines 
would apply only in circumstances that the parties failed to anticipate, or 
anticipated but failed to address, in their contract. Thus, rather than vitiating 
the parties’ intent, they serve to fill gaps not covered by the parties’ intent. 
The key to the anti-opportunism rationale, therefore, is that 
opportunistic behavior always qualifies as a failure of a basic assumption, 
and any intervention to address a failure of a basic assumption cannot 
possibly violate personal sovereignty.167 As proponents of this defense have 
defined it, opportunistic behavior is necessarily impossible to anticipate and 
cost-effectively address in advance. Therefore, when it occurs, it is 
necessarily beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement and constitutes a 
failure of a basic assumption. Ex post equitable intervention under such 
circumstances therefore never vitiates the parties’ consent but rather fills 
gaps not covered by the contract. 
The anti-opportunism defense of ex post doctrines, therefore, provides 
a better interpretation of contract law only if the basic assumption 
requirement makes them consistent with respect for personal sovereignty. It 
does not. It is true that there will always be some circumstances beyond the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of formation. It does not, however, 
follow from this truism that the parties cannot agree on whether their terms 
will control such circumstances anyway, no matter what the result. Indeed, 
every contracting party knows that there are circumstances beyond their 
contemplation that may upset their expectations. To be sure, it is possible 
that parties will prefer to limit the application of their agreement to the 
circumstances within their contemplation and license a court to resolve 
disputes arising under any other circumstances.168 But it is also possible that 
parties will agree that their terms should apply even in circumstances that are 
beyond their contemplation. In such cases, although the parties by definition 
did not foresee the circumstances that have materialized, they foresaw the 
possibility that unforeseeable circumstances might materialize and agreed 
that their terms should nevertheless govern such cases.169 
 
added). 
 167. “[C]ombating opportunism has to be at least in part judicial because of the open-endedness of 
opportunism. The ability of a better informed party to engage in opportunism is hard to bound: 
opportunism might occur on as yet unknown and undefined margins.” Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra 
note 38, at 28.  
 168. Indeed, if most parties have this preference, contract law should have a default rule that implies 
a term licensing such intervention in every contract.  
 169. George Triantis has challenged the assumption that contracting parties are unable rationally to 
manage and allocate risks of unanticipated events: 
While an unknown risk cannot be priced and allocated specifically, it can be priced and 
allocated as part of the package of a more broadly framed risk. For example, consider a party 
who agrees to transport a shipment of goods for a fixed fee. The risk of a nuclear accident in 
the Middle East that causes a dramatic decrease in the production of oil and a consequent 
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The ex post doctrines, however, do not confine ex post judicial 
intervention to contracts in which the parties explicitly or implicitly 
subjected their agreements to judicial intervention when unanticipated 
circumstances materialize. Instead, they subject every contract to such 
review, irrespective of whether parties have explicitly disavowed their 
consent to such intervention.170 The idea that every contract is necessarily 
intended to be subject to a basic assumption inquiry is false. Parties can and 
do anticipate that there may be unanticipated circumstances, and yet provide 
that their contract applies to such circumstances. When they do, and the ex 
post doctrines nonetheless license courts to override the parties’ intent 
anyway, they violate the parties’ personal sovereignty. 
5.  Summary 
The personal sovereignty interpretation of contract law provides a more 
morally compelling justification for the ex ante doctrines, and therefore casts 
contract law in a better moral light, than pluralist interpretations that 
recognize the ex post doctrines as valid and ground them in either 
paternalism or anti-opportunism. In the end, both purported justifications for 
the ex post doctrines render them fundamentally incompatible with respect 
for personal sovereignty and thus require the pluralist interpretation to 
ground the ex ante doctrines on a conception of individual autonomy that is 
morally less compelling than personal sovereignty. In our view, the personal 
sovereignty interpretation is justified in treating the ex post doctrines as legal 
error in order to cast the vast majority of contract law in the best moral light 
possible. Moreover, by explaining the seductive appeal of the ex post fallacy 
that separates liability and remedy, the personal sovereignty interpretation 
casts this sustained judicial error in a historically understandable and 
psychologically plausible light as well. 
 
increase in its price might not be foreseen. As a result, this risk cannot be allocated explicitly 
in the contract. However, the broader risk of a large increase in the price of oil for any reason 
can be. Therefore, there is no gap to be filled by the doctrine of impracticability: the risk of 
nuclear accident, though unforeseen, is allocated implicitly. Instead, the doctrine alters the 
contractual allocation of the risk and its proponents must advance a rationale for the 
reallocation. 
George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 452 (1992). 
 170. The anti-opportunist argument for equity explicitly contemplates that the ex post doctrines 
should apply even if the parties expressly reject them:  
The ability of a better informed party to engage in opportunism is hard to bound: opportunism 
might occur on as yet unknown and undefined margins. It is not enough to say that contract law 
will supply defaults for incomplete contracts or that problems can be left to renegotiation. The 
problem is that widening the contractual domain (the state space it covers) might lead to the 
opposite from what one of the parties expected. Although our model provides a reason to think 
that equity should be a strong default, these considerations of uncertainty point to how the 
model might be extended to provide a rationale for mandatory equity in some circumstances. 
Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38, at 28 (emphasis added). 
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III.  THE HARMS OF THE EX POST PERSPECTIVE 
As we showed in Part I, the penalty rule, the just compensation 
principle, and the rules ranging from forfeiture to excuse from hardship are 
vestiges of the centuries-long tradition of policing penal bonds, a tradition 
begun at equity and transplanted into the common law. While few 
contemporary cases invoke these doctrines directly, they cast a long shadow 
over the ability of contracting parties to implement their ex ante intentions. 
The ex post fallacy continues to influence common law judges and the 
insistence on separating liability and remedy in contract application provides 
prominent exemplars to support the claim of pluralist scholars that ex post 
fairness properly remains a doctrinal constraint on ex ante contracting. In 
contrast, as we argued in Part II, the personal sovereignty explanation of 
American contract law justifies the rejection of the ex post doctrines as legal 
error. In this Part, we explain how these lingering errors gratuitously increase 
the difficulties parties face in achieving their ex ante goals and thereby 
undermine personal sovereignty. We then illustrate how the presence of 
erroneous doctrine has cultivated a judicial receptivity to the ex post 
perspective more generally, fostering a judicial reluctance to apply ex ante 
doctrines rigorously and predictably. 
A.  CONTEMPORARY LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACT REMEDIES 
We have seen that American contract law endorses a “just 
compensation principle” that provides a mandatory rule of compensatory 
damages for breach of contract.171 Parties can attempt to opt out of court-
determined compensatory damages by indicating the amount to which a non-
breacher will be entitled in the event of a breach, but contract doctrine 
constrains their choice of an appropriate liquidated or limited damage clause. 
The doctrine of unconscionability places a process constraint on the lower 
bound of limited damages,172 and the penalty doctrine imposes a hard, upper 
bound on supra-compensatory liquidated damages.173 Thus, under black-
 
 171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (“The purposes of awarding contract 
damages is to compensate the injured party.”); id. at ch. 16, topic 2, intro. note (“The initial assumption 
is that the injured party is entitled to full compensation for his actual loss.”); RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS § 329 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“Where a right of action for breach exists, compensatory 
damages will be given for the net amount of the losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant’s 
breach . . . if established in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 330–346.”); see also U.C.C. § 1-305(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (“The remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial 
Code must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position 
as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages 
may be had except as specifically provided in [the Code] . . . .”).  
 172. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718 cmt. 1 (“An unreasonably small amount [in liquidated 
damages] . . . might be stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses.”). 
 173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e (“Some types of terms are not enforced, 
regardless of context; examples are provisions for unreasonably large liquidated damages . . . .”); id. 
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letter contract doctrine, courts will not enforce any liquidated or limited 
damage clause that does not fall within the range of “compensatory 
damages.”174 By limiting the range of party freedom to choose the remedial 
duties triggered by breach, the mandatory liquidated and limited damages 
rules undermine contracting parties’ ability to choose terms that maximize 
the expected value of their contracts.175 
American courts have partially mitigated the effects of these autonomy-
limiting doctrines by permitting parties to end-run the penalty doctrine’s 
constraints. In Section III.A.1, we show how common law courts have 
sought to cabin the just compensation principle by enforcing contractual 
arrangements that are clearly designed to subject a breaching party to both 
under-compensatory and supra-compensatory damages, provided those 
arrangements violate only the spirit, but not the letter, of the penalty rule. 
Nonetheless, as we show more fully in Section III.A.2, there is little question 
that the penalty doctrine and its companion, the mandatory just 
compensation principle, impair the parties’ ex ante choices of how to allocate 
risks. 
1.  Common Law Courts Require Parties to Work Around the Penalty Rule 
The judicial instinct to police extortionate and fraudulently enforced 
penal bonds was far too ingrained by the beginning of the nineteenth century 
for common law courts simply to set it aside to accommodate the contractual 
innovations attending the industrial revolution.176 Instead, they left those 
doctrines intact but over time allowed parties to contract around them. Well-
known and time-honored drafting techniques now allow parties to include 
some enforceable remedial schemes that are under—or over—
compensatory.177 
One method of escaping the penalty rule is to frame remedial provisions 
as substantive terms of the contract rather than as the consequences of a 
contract breach. Damages, after all, are only a subset of the available choices 
the law gives parties to choose how and whether to terminate the contract, 
choices that give the promisor control over the extent of the remedial 
 
§ 355 cmt. a (“[C]ourts in contract cases do not award damages to punish the party in breach or to serve 
as an example to others unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive 
damages are recoverable.”). 
 174. See, e.g., id. § 356; U.C.C. § 2-718. 
 175. Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1429. 
 176. See, e.g., Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 133 (1858) (adopting the principle of “just 
compensation for the loss or injury actually sustained” (emphasis omitted)). 
 177. See, e.g., Cal. & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(enforcing a clause providing that “if ‘Delivery of the Vessel’ was not made on ‘the Delivery Date’ of 
June 30, 1981, Sun would pay C and H ‘as per-day liquidated damages and not as a penalty,’ . . . ‘a 
reasonable measure of the damages’ [of] $17,000 per day”). 
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commitment embedded in its promise. Termination provisions grant the 
promisor the option to terminate the contract by incurring a cost that is 
unrelated to compensation.178 Similarly, parties may frame remedial 
provisions as substantive terms such as the right to cancel upon payment of 
a fee or loss of a deposit.179 Buyers often agree to make over-compensatory 
payments: they pay cancellation fees for walking away from airline tickets 
or hotel reservations even when the seller resells their seats or rooms. Parties 
may also escape the compensation principle by agreeing to an explicit 
option180 or to alternative methods of contract performance rather than 
providing for a primary obligation to perform and a secondary obligation to 
pay damages.181 
This array of doctrinal work-arounds reflects the implicit judicial 
understanding that the penalty doctrine is at war with the animating purpose 
of contract law. If courts fully supported not just the letter, but the spirit, of 
the penalty doctrine, they would not tolerate, let alone facilitate, termination 
clauses and other contractual devices that, in effect, allow the parties to 
circumvent the purpose of that rule. Yet the longevity of the precedents 
creating the doctrine have thus far prevented courts from simply dismissing 
it as a holdover from a by-gone era that undermines parties’ contractual 
intent. That tradition of well-established doctrine continues to constrain the 
doctrinal options facing common law courts and has provided a prominent 
exemplar to support the claim of pluralist scholars that ex post fairness 
remains a doctrinal constraint on ex ante contracting.182   
 
 178. Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1454. 
 179. Buyers of goods can often return goods and cancel the contract for free with no questions asked 
or upon the payment of a small fee. An example is the electronics store that sells television sets for $1,000 
and offers full refunds for any returns made within thirty days. This contract makes no effort to 
compensate the seller for losses suffered when the buyer walks away from the exchange. Id. at 1430–31.  
 180. See generally Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187, 
2200 (2004) (“Structuring a contract as an option can also help the parties evade the penalty 
doctrine . . . .”).  
 181. Many options are categorized doctrinally as alternative contracts. Traditional analysis has 
distinguished the alternative provision designed to secure performance of the primary promise (a 
liquidated damage clause) from two promised alternatives between which the promisor can choose, each 
an agreed exchange for the consideration given by the promisee (an option). RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS § 339 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1932); see also, e.g., Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 511 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Cal. 1973) (recognizing “validity of provisions varying the acceptable 
performance under a contract upon the happening of a contingency”).  
 182. See, for example, Melvin Eisenberg’s paternalist justification of the penalty rule on the ground, 
inter alia, that it prevents parties subject to various cognitive errors from binding themselves to supra-
compensatory damages. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1743, 1779–86 (2000).  
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2.  The Compensation Principle Undermines Ex Ante Intent 
We have shown how common law courts have enforced substantive 
terms that enable parties to avoid many of the constraints of the penalty rule 
and the just compensation principle. But these measures are costly and 
largely fail to protect liquidated damages agreements that fail to satisfy the 
penalty rule. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.183 provides a salient 
example of the problem facing contracting parties. By striking down a “take 
or pay” clause that had been carefully negotiated between sophisticated 
parties, the court deprived a commercial seller of an important contractual 
protection against moral hazard risk that was paid for in the ex ante 
contract.184 Moreover, the costs of a mandatory rule of just compensation 
extend beyond cases, like Lake River, which strike down freely negotiated 
liquidated damages agreements.185 Individuals bargain at their peril to 
protect personal, sentimental, or idiosyncratic value in their contracts. Cases 
such as Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.186 illustrate how the just 
compensation principle is used to deny recovery unjustly to injured parties, 
and the deterrent effect of these decisions continues to prevent others from 
protecting important values in their contracts.187 
The mandatory just compensation principle has other pernicious effects. 
As we explained in Part II, the ex post fallacy has led some courts to conform 
to a proportionality standard in the distribution of contractual gains and 
losses that ignores the ex ante contractual allocation of risks. Courts have 
denied recovery of actual losses in a number of cases in which the fear of 
overcompensation caused them to overturn fairly negotiated agreements 
designed to enhance the expected value of the contract. Consider the choice 
between market damages and lost profits in breached contracts for the sale 
of goods traded in well-developed markets. Here, common law courts have 
long held that market damages—the difference between contract price and 
market price—is the proper default measure of recovery.188 In some cases, 
 
 183. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 184. In questioning the continued validity of the penalty doctrine, the court stated that  
[T]he parties . . . will, in deciding whether to include a penalty clause in their contract, 
weigh the gains against the costs . . . and will include the clause only if the benefits 
exceed those costs as well as all other costs. On this view, the refusal to enforce penalty 
clauses is (at best) paternalistic—and it seems odd that courts should display parental 
solicitude for large corporations. 
Id. at 1289. 
 185. See, e.g., Rye v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.E.2d 458 (N.Y. 1974); Fisher v. Schmeling, 
520 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1994). 
 186. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Peevyhouse in 1994 in a case with substantially identical facts, 
Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994). 
 187. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.  
 188. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-708(1), 2-713 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); see 
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however, had the seller delivered the goods and the buyer accepted them, the 
injured party would not have derived its economic gain from the fluctuations 
in market value. In these cases, courts have too often limited the injured party 
to its ex post lost profits rather than apply the ex ante market damages 
default. 
Such was the case in Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co.,189 
where the court limited the plaintiff seller to its ninety-five thousand dollars 
guaranteed profit and denied recovery of the three hundred thousand dollars 
market price differential on the ground that market damages would 
overcompensate the seller.190 The concern that this damage measure may 
undercompensate mirrors the concern that market damages may 
overcompensate. Thus, market damages are often thought (incorrectly) to 
deny a volume seller full recovery for the loss of a sale that cannot be 
replaced by reselling the goods to another buyer on the market.191 In both of 
these circumstances, courts that substitute lost profits for market damages 
fail to appreciate that damage rules are contract terms that allocate risks 
between the parties differently. Lost profit damages reflect an ex post 
perspective. They measure the value of the completed contract based on what 
the parties actually did. Market damages, on the other hand, apply a measure 
of events extrinsic to the parties’ behavior. Before a court applies a damage 
measure, therefore, it must first decide how the parties expressly or by 
implication allocated the relevant market risks. The question, therefore, is 
 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8, at 611–12. 
 189. Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 190. Id. at 214, 217. Other courts have followed the ex post reasoning in Nobs Chemical. See, e.g., 
H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1985); Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 
F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co., 636 F. Supp. 1498 (E.D. Mich. 
1986). But see Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471 (Kan. 1992) (compensation principle does not trump 
market damages simply because contract-market differential exceeds promisee’s economic loss). 
 191.  The critiques of the lost volume seller cases are many. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for 
Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (1990). Scott and Triantis 
argue that the debate over lost volume damages has missed the important point that parties can (and do) 
choose among contract terms that will provide the buyer different options to terminate the contract. 
Scholarly debate has focused on how much of the seller’s selling costs or overhead were 
“consumed” by the breaching buyer and whether the default measure of damages ought to be 
the full profit lost by the seller (which often is over compensatory) or incidental damages (which 
may be under compensatory). But the focus on lost volume and selling costs is a red herring. 
Rather, the choice between market damages and lost profits [in the lost volume cases is really] 
a choice between alternative provisions [for terminating the contract].  
Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1483. 
  Contracting parties may choose different terms that provide a buyer the right to terminate an 
executory contract for a fee. The choice of the termination fee will necessarily affect the price paid in the 
ex ante contract by the buyer for the privilege to terminate. If the exercise price is very large, the option 
price (reflected in the breach damages) may be very small. The parties do not intend that the option price 
reflect the seller’s loss from the terminated sale. Indeed, the parties might rationally choose a free option 
to terminate as a marketing tool. In sum, whether a given volume seller would have chosen to write an 
option to a buyer and at what price the option would be offered simply cannot be determined a priori. 
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not which damage default rule better protects a given economic advantage. 
Rather, the ex ante perspective should frame the question: what economic 
advantage did the contract protect?192 In Nobs Chemical, for example, the 
fixed price contract functioned as an option on the future supply of the goods 
at the contract price. The market damages the plaintiff claimed reflected the 
ex ante value of the option.193 Substituting an ex post lost profits measure 
undermined the value of the option contract and denied the plaintiff the 
recovery it had paid for.194 
In sum, in a fixed price market contract, the market damages default 
rule supports the ex ante risk allocation that most parties would choose 
precisely because it maximizes the value of the contract at the time it was 
made. In cases where market damages might be thought to be excessive 
because, as in Nobs Chemical, the injured party has laid off a portion of the 
contract risk, a court that substitutes the ex post lost profits measure is, in 
effect, imposing a mandatory limited damages rule. In the polar case, where 
buyers breach contracts with volume sellers, a lost profits rule functions as a 
mandatory cancellation penalty. In both cases, courts that are tempted by the 
ex post fallacy to separate liability and remedy have impaired contract rights 
that were paid for and compromised the ability of future parties to control 
the allocation of market risks in ways that reflect their concern to maximize 
the expected value of their contract. 
The continued allegiance of courts to the just compensation principle is 
supported and reinforced by pluralist scholars who rely on the doctrine to 
support the broader claim that ex post review is essential to preserving 
individual justice. The stubborn resistance of some courts and commentators 
to the clear preference for market damages in the common law and the 
Uniform Commercial Code is fueled by the argument that the mandatory 
compensation principle (embodied in UCC §1-305(a))195 trumps the ex ante 
market damages rules.196 Here, assertion substitutes for argument and 
 
 192. Henry Gabriel, The Seller’s Election of Remedies Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An 
Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (1988); Victor P. Goldberg, Reckoning Contract 
Damages: Valuation of the Contract as an Asset, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 301 (2018). 
 193. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 (2014); Scott & 
Triantis, supra note 67. 
 194. An analogous problem occurs when the seller breaches a fixed price contract (after the market 
rises) and the buyer has, before breach, contracted to resell the goods at a fixed price to a remote 
purchaser. Here, courts have been similarly inclined to limit the buyer to its lost profits as measured by 
the contract price/resale price differential, rather than awarding full market damages. See, e.g., Allied 
Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 195. “The remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code must be liberally administered to 
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed . . . .” U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
 196. See, e.g., Roy Ryden Anderson, A Look Back at the Future of UCC Damages Remedies: 
Strategic Behavior and Market Price Damages, 71 SMU L. REV. 185, 196 (2018) (asserting that the most 
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abandons careful analysis of ex ante intent. Thus, once again the vestiges of 
centuries of policing penal bonds undermines respect for personal 
sovereignty. 
The default rules governing recovery of consequential damages are 
another area where the compensation principle leads courts to promote 
recoveries inconsistent with the terms that most parties would prefer. Under 
current doctrine, for example, a seller must deliver conforming goods or pay 
the buyer damages, including allowable consequential damages, measured 
by the difference between the value of the goods accepted and the value of 
conforming goods to the buyer.197 This damages default rule supports most 
parties’ intentions because it increases the joint expected value of the 
contract at the time of formation by motivating the seller to perform by 
tendering goods when doing so will increase value. Early common law cases 
limited a buyer’s ability to recover consequential damages by requiring a 
tacit agreement between the parties as to the particular consequences that 
affected the buyer’s valuation.198 However, most modern courts (encouraged 
by the Second Restatement of Contracts and the UCC) have replaced the tacit 
agreement test with a softer “reason to know” standard on the ground that 
otherwise buyers would too readily be denied full compensation.199 But 
valuations are often very difficult to verify. As a consequence, buyers often 
have an incentive to overstate their valuations and, in the absence of an ex 
ante agreement specifying the buyer’s valuation, sellers often are disabled 
from insuring risks that turn on the buyers’ private information. 
The “reason to know” standard for recovering consequential damages 
functions unfairly to impose costs on sellers that were not contemplated in 
the initial agreement. The result is that commercial parties routinely opt out 
of the consequential damages default rule. In place of the default term, 
parties create complex repair-and-replacement provisions that strive to 
allocate the risks of product defects in other ways.200 This method of opting 
out is a more costly and less accurate means of achieving the risk allocation 
 
important reason why courts should not award ex ante market damages when the ex post losses are either 
greater or smaller is that the compensation principle “does not allow it”). 
 197. U.C.C. § 2-714 (2), (3) (“The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at 
the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have 
had if they had been as warranted . . . In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under 
[§ 2-715] may also be recovered.”). 
 198. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (“If the special circumstances under which 
the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants . . . the damages 
resulting from the breach . . . would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach 
of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated.”). 
 199. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a); id. cmt 2 (“The ‘tacit agreement’ test . . . is rejected.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 200. For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 41. 
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parties most prefer. Yet it would be unnecessary if courts appreciated the 
moral hazard consequences of this extension of the compensation principle 
and returned to the tacit consent doctrine. 
B.  HARDSHIP EXCUSES FOR FAILURES TO PERFORM: FORFEITURE, 
FRUSTRATION, AND IMPRACTICABILITY 
The black letter doctrines governing forfeiture,201 frustration,202 
impracticability,203 and related doctrines excusing performance on grounds 
of hardship illustrate the inherent tension between the ex ante and the ex post 
in contemporary contract doctrine. There is a deep rift within the common 
law between the ex ante contract doctrines requiring strict enforcement of 
formal terms agreed to under free and fair conditions and the ex post 
doctrines permitting abrogation of those terms when strict enforcement 
appears to impose severe hardship. Here the ex post fallacy invites courts to 
distort formal doctrine and interpret contracts in ways that undermine the 
parties’ chosen ex ante means of accomplishing their contractual objectives. 
1.  The Reluctance to Enforce Express Contract Terms (Herein of 
Forfeiture) 
The doctrines of contract interpretation direct courts to respect the 
parties’ express terms. Express terms can specify both primary terms 
governing the parties’ performance obligations, and secondary, or meta, 
terms governing the interpretation of their agreement.204 Express terms 
therefore provide the most powerful tool available to parties for signaling 
their ex ante intentions: they allow the parties not only to communicate to 
each other and to courts the precise content of certain terms they wish to 
include in their agreement, but to control the extent to which courts may 
imply additional terms into their agreement.205 The doctrines governing the 
 
 201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b. 
 202. Id. § 265. 
 203. Id. § 261. 
 204. For example, as discussed in Part II.A supra, express written terms can constrain a court’s 
discretion to imply terms into an agreement by directing the court under the parol evidence doctrine not 
to admit prior evidence of implied terms. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (evidence not admissible to prove 
even additional terms consistent with express terms of fully integrated writing); U.C.C. § 1-205(4) 
(express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade); U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (express terms 
control course of performance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible in evidence to contradict term of writing). 
Id. § 216(1) (evidence of consistent additional term is not admissible to supplement fully integrated 
agreement). 
 205. For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An 
Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 281–
86 (1985) (arguing that express terms are signals that enable parties to opt out of implied default terms 
and to supplement the defaults with additional customized terms); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 
584–94 (maximizing party control over express terms promotes efficient contracting).   
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interpretation of express terms thus present another occasion in which ex 
post equity can undermine the parties’ ex ante intent. The law of conditions 
vividly illustrates this deep tension between the formal obligation to respect 
the parties’ ex ante specification of express terms and the desire to provide 
ex post justice. 
Since parties incur duties in contracts by making promises, a party who 
makes an event a condition of its promise is under a duty to perform that 
promise only if the event occurs.206 A common example is an insurance 
contract that imposes on the insurer a duty to pay if the insured brings a claim 
within a specified time period after the insured suffers a covered loss. The 
insurer’s duty to pay arises when the insured suffers a covered loss, but that 
duty is discharged if the insured fails to bring the claim within the specified 
time period. The law of conditions explicitly endorses the principle of 
personal sovereignty by committing to the strict enforcement of all express 
conditions agreed to under free and fair circumstances.207 Yet it is also home 
to the hoary equitable maxim that the law abhors a forfeiture.208 The anti-
forfeiture norm suffuses the law of conditions, which therefore reads like a 
schizophrenic text, in one sentence insisting on the sanctity of strict 
construction and enforcement of conditions in spite of forfeiture, while in the 
next sentence admonishing courts, whenever interpretation allows, to avoid 
the conclusion that the promisor’s obligation is subject to an enforceable 
condition if enforcement of the condition would raise the specter of 
forfeiture.209 
 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224. The event on which the promise is 
conditioned may be “largely within the control of the obligor (the homeowner’s honest satisfaction with 
the paint job), the obligee (the insured’s furnishing proof of loss), or a third person (the bank’s approval 
of the mortgage application), or is largely beyond the control of anyone (damage as a result of fire).” E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 520 (3d ed. 1999).  
 207. Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp., 600 A.2d 448, 452–53 (N.H. 1991) (“[W]hen the parties 
expressly condition their performance upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, rather than 
simply including the event as one of the general terms of the contract, the parties’ bargained-for 
expectation of strict compliance should be given effect.”); see also Nielsen v. Provident Sav. Life 
Assurance Soc’y of N.Y., 66 P. 663, 665 (Cal. 1901) (“[C]onditions . . . when made, must be construed 
and enforced . . . according to the expressed understanding of the parties making them. It is not for the 
courts to dispense with such limitations and conditions, nor by judicial legislation to insert a different 
contract from that deliberately made by the parties.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 1962) (“[It is a] well-
recognized principle that forfeitures are not favored either in law or equity . . . . One claiming forfeiture 
carries a heavy burden of establishing his right thereto be clear and unmistakable proof.”); Stevenson v. 
Parker, 608 P.2d 1263, 1267–68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (“This court has held the general doctrine that 
forfeitures are not favored in the law, and that courts should promptly seize upon any 
circumstance . . . that would indicate an election or an agreement to waive the harsh, and at times unjust, 
remedy of forfeiture . . . .” (quoting Spedden v. Sykes, 98 P. 752, 754 (Wash. 1908))). 
 209. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b (“The policy favoring 
freedom of contract requires that, within broad limits . . . the agreement of the parties should be honored 
even though forfeiture results.”), id. § 226 cmt. c (“[T]o the extent that the parties have, by a term of their 
agreement, clearly made an event a condition, they can be confident that a court will ordinarily feel 
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The judicial embrace of the anti-forfeiture norm is another 
manifestation of the ex post fallacy. Even if contracting parties write an 
express term that unequivocally creates a condition, equity invites courts to 
exercise their discretion ex post to excuse the condition whenever its 
enforcement would create a forfeiture and the court finds the condition was 
not a material part of the agreement at the time of formation.210 Even if a 
court agrees that a contract contains a material, express condition, the norm 
encourages the court to find that the promisor has implicitly waived the 
condition, either retrospectively or prospectively, whenever enforcement of 
the condition would create a forfeiture.211 
In sum, the doctrinal residue of the forfeiture rule, which was designed 
to prevent the abuse of penal bonds, explicitly stacks the deck heavily against 
the finding and enforcement of conditions on the ground that the law abhors 
a forfeiture. Viewed from the perspective of the commitment to vindicate the 
parties’ ex ante intentions, the anti-forfeiture norm leads courts to make two 
false assumptions. The first is that parties are unlikely to select terms that 
create the risk of forfeiture. This assumption underlies the doctrines directing 
courts to avoid finding a condition absent express language that 
unmistakably creates it. The second assumption is that express conditions 
sometimes are not material at the time of formation. This assumption 
underlies the doctrines directing courts to avoid enforcing even clear, express 
conditions. Yet contracting parties often favor the selection of precise terms 
that create rule-like obligations that are easy for the parties not only to 
observe but also to verify and enforce in court. Express conditions serve just 
 
constrained strictly to apply that term”), and id. § 229 cmt. a (“[I]f the term that requires the occurrence 
of the event as a condition is expressed in unmistakable language, the possibility of forfeiture will not 
affect the interpretation of that language.”), with Bornholdt v. S. Pac. Co., 327 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(“A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is 
created. . . . Where there are two possible constructions, one of which leads to a forfeiture and the other 
avoids it, the rule of law is well settled . . . that the construction which avoids forfeiture must be made if 
it is at all possible.” (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1442 (Deering 1872))), and Kalina v. Eckert, 497 A.2d 
1384, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“[A] provision will not be construed to result in a forfeiture unless no 
other reasonable construction is possible.”). 
 210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229. 
 211. See, e.g., Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 73 P. 740, 741 (Cal. 1903) (“[T]he right to 
declare a forfeiture, being a matter entirely for the benefit of a lessor or vendor, can be, even by parol, 
effectually waived by either.”); Bielski v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 150 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Mich. 1967) 
(“[W]aivers [of contract clause requiring arbitration as condition precedent to suit] need not be expressed 
in terms, but may be implied by the acts, omissions, or conduct of the insurer or its agents authorized in 
such respect.”) (quoting 29A AM. JUR. Insurance § 1617 (1936)); Cochran v. Grebe, 578 S.W.2d 351, 
354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (asserting that forfeitures are highly disfavored by law and courts are therefore 
quick to find a waiver or estoppel); Miraldi v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 356 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1971) (law abhors forfeiture and waiver will be inferred whenever it can be reasonably inferred from the 
facts); Brown v. Powell, 648 N.W.2d 329, 333 (S.D. 2002) (“Because forfeitures of land sale contracts 
are highly disfavored by the law, courts are generally quick to find a waiver of conditions alleged as a 
basis for a claim of breach.”). 
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this purpose: they afford a promisor protection from certain risks, in lieu of 
having to prove losses that are difficult to verify in a suit for damages. 
When sophisticated commercial parties clearly agree to express 
conditions, there is no principled reason to doubt that the promisee 
understood the risk of forfeiture and bargained for compensating contractual 
benefits from the promisor. On this view, conditions are always material 
from the ex ante perspective because they allocate risks between the parties, 
the contract compensates each party for bearing those risks, and the parties 
inevitably rely on that allocation of risks. Since the parties’ intent at the time 
of formation determines materiality, conditions will always be material. 
More fundamentally, the concept of forfeiture begs the question by 
presuming that the party against whom the condition is invoked is sacrificing 
an entitlement. If the condition is agreed to and (presumably) paid for in the 
ex ante contract, there is no entitlement to refuse to abide by the exercise of 
the condition ex post. 
2.  The Misuse of Excuse 
Ex post doctrines granting excuse from hardship, including mistake, 
frustration, and commercial impracticability, are contemporary 
manifestations of early equity’s effort to prevent the enforcement of the face 
amount of a penal bond despite either full or substantial performance by the 
promisor.212 When applied to a commercial contract reached under free and 
fair conditions, the outcome can result in denial of individual justice for the 
party seeking to enforce the terms agreed upon (and paid for) in the contract. 
A particularly salient example is the well-known case, Aluminum Co. of 
America v. Essex Group, Inc. (“ALCOA”).213 ALCOA is a paradigmatic 
illustration of those instances where courts conclude that individual justice 
requires them to intervene under the post-formation circumstances that have 
materialized. In ALCOA, the court granted the plaintiff relief from the 
contract’s detailed price indexing provision on the grounds of mutual 
mistake, commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose.214 While 
 
 212. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 213. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
 214. Alcoa and Essex had entered into a long-term tolling contract whereby Alcoa undertook to 
convert alumina supplied by Essex into aluminum. The contract specified a fixed quantity of seventy-five 
million pounds of aluminum to be delivered to Essex per year. The contract contained a detailed price 
indexing provision. At Essex’s insistence, the index relating to Alcoa’s costs included a circuit breaker if 
the index rose too fast relative to the underlying market price, but Alcoa did not require a corresponding 
“booster” if the index moved too slowly. Unfortunately for Alcoa, the index moved much too slowly 
relative to the actual market price for alumina owing, in part, to the underrepresentation of energy costs 
in the basket of inputs that comprise the WPI-IC relative to the costs of converting alumina into 
aluminum. The court granted Alcoa relief on the grounds of mutual mistake, commercial impracticability, 
and frustration of purpose. Rather than excuse Alcoa, however, the court chose to reform the contract by 
rewriting the price term. Id. at 55–93. 
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the reformation remedy adopted by the court in ALCOA has not been 
followed elsewhere (as we have noted, claims of excuse are only rarely 
granted by courts),215 nevertheless the case provides a vivid illustration of 
how courts in other cases can use ex post reasoning in similar but more subtle 
ways to vitiate ex ante intent. 
One question in ALCOA was whether both parties were mistaken about 
the ability of the price index to track future market prices as accurately as its 
historical performance had indicated it would. The evidence strongly 
suggests that both the Aluminum Company of America (“Alcoa”) and Essex 
were allocating the risks of a deviation between market prices and the index 
by agreeing to a carefully drafted pricing mechanism.216 By choosing a 
precisely defined price index in conscious recognition of the risks that the 
index might deviate from future market prices, the parties implicitly 
allocated to the seller the risk that the index might malfunction and increase 
too slowly, and allocated to the buyer the risk that the index might 
malfunction and increase too rapidly. Essex chose to reduce the risk of the 
index rising too rapidly by insisting on a circuit breaker once the index price 
exceeded 65% of the market price of aluminum. Alcoa, represented by 
sophisticated legal and economic experts, chose not to insert a corresponding 
“booster’ should the index rise too slowly. 
Despite these facts, the court held that Alcoa was excused from full 
performance on the ground that both parties mistakenly believed that the 
escalator term in the price index would function in the future in the same 
way it had when tested against past economic conditions. The court rejected 
the argument that the error, if any, was in predicting future economic 
conditions and not in any erroneous beliefs relating “to the facts as they exist 
at the time of the making of the contract”217 as required by the doctrine of 
mutual mistake. The court was equally unmoved by the fact that black letter 
doctrine requires a finding that the parties made a definite assumption that 
the fact in question exists and made their agreement in the belief that there 
was no risk with respect to it.218 Clearly, there was sufficient sense of risk to 
motivate Essex to insert a cap on the risk that market prices might outstrip 
 
 215. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and 
Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 317 (1992). 
 216. The parties incurred substantial front-end drafting costs. These costs are rational to incur only 
if they exploit the parties’ informational advantage ex ante. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott & George 
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–51 (2006). 
 217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The court held 
that the mistake did not relate to future economic conditions but rather was a mistake as to a “present 
actuarial error.” Aluminum Co., 499 F. Supp. at 63. 
 218. TIMOTHY MURRAY, ARTHUR L. CORBIN, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §605 (1960). 
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the escalator. 
The court in ALCOA also found grounds to excuse Alcoa based on 
commercial impracticability and frustration of purpose. These doctrines 
grant excuse only if one party experiences extreme hardship because of a 
future event whose occurrence was unforeseeable.219 The court did not even 
address the question of whether the occurrence of an unforeseeable future 
event was essential to granting excuse on the grounds of impracticability or 
frustration.220 Rather, the court focused exclusively on the element of 
hardship, finding that Alcoa’s losses of $8 million after 10 years, coupled 
with projections that future losses might total $60 million, was sufficient to 
grant relief from hardship. This finding runs counter to the statements by 
many courts that the hardship necessary to grant excuse must “be more than 
merely onerous or expensive. It must be positively unjust to hold the parties 
bound.”221 
The court in ALCOA claimed to be maintaining fidelity to the parties’ 
contractual intent by reforming the price index when it did not function as 
the parties anticipated it would. The court’s solution was to guarantee that 
Alcoa could at least recover its costs plus a minimum one cent per pound 
profit.222 Even if the court correctly divined that the parties’ purpose in this 
case was to implement the equivalent of a cost-plus contract, the ex post 
intervention was indefensible. The court’s decision undermined the parties’ 
careful efforts to design their contract optimally. By distorting the doctrines 
of mistake, impracticability, and frustration, the court deprived the parties of 
their ex ante choice of how best to mimic a cost-plus contract while avoiding 
the moral hazard risk that such a contract would impose on Essex. 
Furthermore, the prospect of ex post judicial intervention under these 
circumstances severely impairs the ability of future commercial parties to 
choose the contract terms that best achieve their purposes. 
 
 219. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
 220. On the question of foreseeability, the court held that “the foreseeability of a variation between 
the [escalator term] and Alcoa’s costs would not preclude relief under the doctrine of impracticability.” 
Aluminum Co., 499 F. Supp. at 76. The case occurred during the period of volatile energy prices in the 
1970s owing to changes in environmental standards and the OPEC oil embargo. Other courts have 
consistently held that events owing to the energy crisis of the 1970s were reasonably foreseeable by 
commercial parties contracting during this period. E. Air Lines, 415 F. Supp., at 441. 
 221. Ocean Tramp Tankers v. V/O Sovfracht (the Eugenia) [1964] 2 QB 226, 239; see also Neal-
Cooper Grain Co. v. Texan Gulf Sulfur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Schafer v. Sunset Packing 
Co., 474 P.2d 529 (Or. 1970). 
 222. Aluminum Co., 499 F. Supp. at 80. The court held that the failure of the price index to achieve 
the parties’ ends was: (1) a mistake of both parties as to a basic assumption of the contract justifying 
rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake, (2) the occurrence of an event whose non-occurrence was a 
basic assumption of the contract justifying excuse on the grounds of commercial impracticability, and (3) 
the occurrence of an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption thus frustrating Alcoa’s 
principal purposes under the contract. Id.  
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To be sure, ALCOA may be seen as an outlier; a court ignoring 
controlling legal principles to grant excuse from hardship to a Fortune 500 
company contracting with a much smaller firm. Cases like ALCOA, however, 
have a feedback effect by prompting pluralist scholars to call for an even 
broader exercise of ex post judicial review in cases of alleged hardship. 
Melvin Eisenberg, a leading pluralist scholar, has recently argued for 
expanding the domain of the excuse doctrines based on the presumed 
inability of private actors to anticipate remote risks.223 Eisenberg argues that 
ex post relief should be granted if, because of an unexpected rise in prices, 
performance would result in a loss to a promisor that is significantly greater 
than the risk the parties reasonably would have expected the promisor to 
take.224 In a similar vein, Robert Hillman has argued for a pluralist approach 
to commercial impracticability that considers fairness norms.225 Hillman 
identifies a number of fairness norms that should determine whether one 
party to an agreement is entitled to cease or curtail performance, such as 
when the parties fail expressly to allocate the risk of a calamitous event. Here 
he argues that the courts should adjust the contract ex post based on the 
fairness principle that the parties should agree to share unallocated losses.226 
The irony, of course, is that calls to increase ex post intervention for hardship 
on fairness grounds is unfair to the party who paid the counterparty to bear 
the risk in question. 
C.  EX POST INTERVENTION TO SANCTION OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR 
Breach of contract claims are the result of many different factors. Often 
one of the parties has inadvertently failed to fulfill its obligations under the 
contract. A second possibility, however, is that the dispute occurs because 
one of the parties is opportunistically violating the deal. As we discussed in 
Part II, pluralist scholars have argued that the task of policing opportunism 
is an appropriate exercise of ex post intervention by common law courts.227 
Ayotte, Friedman, and Smith believe that the risk of opportunistic breach is 
sufficiently grave that courts should zealously deploy their equity powers ex 
post to punish the opportunistic party, even in the face of an ex ante 
agreement explicitly assigning the contract rights to the alleged 
opportunist.228 They contend that this heightened risk of opportunism 
 
 223. Eisenberg, supra note 15. For a critique of Eisenberg’s analysis, see Victor P. Goldberg, 
Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359 (2010). 
 224. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 209. 
 225. Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. 
REV. 617 (1983). 
 226. Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern 
Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 3. 
 227. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994). 
 228. See Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38.  
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undermines any argument that contracting parties are equipped to deal with 
the risk of opportunism in advance through free and fair ex ante contracting. 
Pluralists typically advert to the obligation of good faith as the doctrinal 
mechanism for policing opportunism. However, the claim that good faith can 
and should be used as an all-purpose weapon for aggressively pursuing ex 
post justice badly misunderstands the role of good faith in American contract 
law. To be sure, both the Restatement and the UCC affirm the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing that attaches to the performance of every contract.229 
But the foundation of the obligation of good faith in American contract law 
is the shared interest of both parties at the time of contract to reduce the 
incidence of behavior that may impair performance of the deal. As §1-304, 
Comment 1 of the UCC makes clear, in American contract law the obligation 
of good faith is not an independent invitation for courts to police bargained 
for exchanges.230 Rather, good faith is an interpretive principle based on the 
presumed ex ante intent of both parties to forego behaviors that might lead 
to tit-for-tat retaliation. By reinforcing informal norms of trust and good 
faith, the parties reduce the expected haggling costs that can result from 
period-to-period efforts to extract maximum individual gains.231 
In short, good faith in American contract law serves the ex ante goals 
of individual justice. The common law and UCC’s good faith doctrines do 
not invite courts to sanction bad faith actions232 by vitiating contractual 
intent, as pluralist scholars maintain. Rather, the good faith requirement 
reflects the judicial presumption that parties ordinarily intend to maximize 
their expected joint gains by relying on courts to enforce norms of trust and 
fairness only when the conditions under which non-legal norms usually 
operate break down. 
*** 
We have outlined the many ways that the vestigial doctrines developed 
by equity to police the abuses of penal bonds at early common law 
undermine respect for personal sovereignty, the value that we have argued 
best explains American contract law. Moreover, we have seen how pluralist 
scholars have used the residue of ex post doctrine to push for an expansion 
of equity into many other domains of contract, including by empowering 
courts to reallocate risks in order to promote paternalism or prevent 
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opportunism. By continuing to recognize and apply the ex post doctrines, 
courts and commentators perpetuate and exacerbate the significant harm 
these doctrines create by gratuitously increasing the burdens and lowering 
the benefits of contracting, thereby undermining respect for personal 
sovereignty within contract law. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that the ex post doctrines of contract law no longer serve the 
purpose of policing against abuses of penal bonds in the common law, the 
puzzle is not why courts are reluctant to apply them, but why they apply them 
at all. Our answer is that the near sacred status of stare decisis, the historically 
entrenched ex post perspective on remedies, and the powerful appeal of the 
ex post fallacy have together placed the ex post doctrines beyond judicial 
reflection. Moreover, by devoting five of its sixteen chapters to extensive 
endorsement of the ex post doctrines, the Second Restatement of Contracts 
effectively enshrined them in the black letter pantheon of valid contract 
law.233 Their formal investiture in the Restatement was the culmination of 
the centuries-old common law practice of treating disproportionate outcomes 
as inherently unjust and unfair. But the common law causes of action that 
gave rise to liability during the period in which this practice evolved left the 
remediation of legal wrongs entirely to the courts. The transformation of 
American contract law into an institution that enforced executory agreements 
enabled the parties to control not only the extent of their liability but the 
consequences of breach as well. Yet the instinctive judicial aversion to 
forfeitures and penalties—a product of the longstanding practice of policing 
against the fraudulent enforcement of penal bonds—was too strong to yield 
to the new logic of the ex ante perspective in contract adjudication. Fueled 
by stare decisis, the old equitable doctrines remained on the books even as 
courts have struggled to reconcile the inherent contradiction between 
contract law’s ex ante perspective and the ex post abrogation of the parties’ 
agreement. That subterranean tension continues to destabilize contract 
adjudication today. 
The case for retaining the ex post doctrines turns on whether they now 
serve a new and compelling purpose. However, the only purposes identified 
by proponents of ex post doctrine—paternalism and anti-opportunism—are 
deeply incompatible with the promotion and protection of personal 
sovereignty. In our view, the personal sovereignty account provides the most 
morally compelling, and therefore the best, explanation of American contract 
law’s ex ante doctrines. Given that these doctrines not only comprise the 
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overwhelming majority of American contract doctrines, but also form its 
foundational core, the continued recognition of the ex post doctrines as valid 
components of American contract law cannot be justified. The time has come 
for courts and commentators to prune the ex post vestigial branch from the 
common law tree. 
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